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Human resources are the most important part of any organization.  If the 
organization is to perform at its best, development and motivation of the employees are 
essential.  
 The research in this study examined the application of the Expectancy Theory and 
how it can be used to obtain a better understanding of teachers’ perceptions about 
motivation and compensation.  There were 198 teachers invited to complete the survey, 
representing the elementary, middle-school, and high-school levels.  Of the 198 teachers 
invited, 131 teachers began the survey, and frequency numbers varied by question.  In the 
end, 118 teachers completed the entire survey and categorical data from the responses 
were presented in frequency and percentage form.     
Demographic data were collected and analyzed.  Teachers’ responses to questions 
determined if there were relationships between the multiple components of the 
Expectancy Theory.  ANOVA data were presented to identify relationships and 
correlations among the Expectancy Theory components and demographic information.  
These relationships help understand teachers’ perspectives about effort (hard work), 
instrumentality (the belief that performance will lead to a reward), valence (the value of 
the reward), and motivational force.  
 The information obtained in this study provides school administrators, school 
boards, and policy makers with information that could lead to changes in teacher 
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compensation and motivation.  The research may encourage stakeholders to conduct a 
comprehensive review of their evaluation and compensation practices as a means to 
increase teacher motivation.  School leaders can use the information to design plans that 
address the challenges of recruiting, motivating, and retaining highly qualified teachers. 
 























 Managing human capital may require managers and, in the case of schools, 
administrators to design plans and programs to motivate employees.  Maximizing 
employee performance is critical to achieve the educational goals of federal, state, and 
local initiatives aimed at improving school performance and that are founded on the 
understanding that organizations progress to the extent they are able to motivate and 
develop their employees (Webb & Norton, 2013).  Current practices for teacher 
compensation may create challenges due to the salary scale’s inflexibility.  Compensation 
plans have three broad objectives—to attract, retain, and motivate—qualified and 
competent employees (Seyfarth, 2005).  Without the ability to vary from the single-salary 
schedule or to provide other rewards, teacher motivation may be impacted. 
Since passage of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001, much has been done in 
the name of school reform and student academic performance.  School reform efforts in 
the United States focus on the identification, recruitment, motivation, and retention of 
highly effective teachers.  The focused change in emphasis on teaching and the teaching 
profession gained national awareness when, in 2009, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation phased out funding for small high schools and, instead, turned its attention 
toward teacher quality (Moore Johnson & Papay, 2009).  That same year, President 
Barack Obama indicated the need to improve teacher quality could be accomplished by 
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reforming teacher-compensation practices.  “It’s time to start rewarding good teachers, 
[and] stop making excuses for bad ones” (as cited in Bazinet, 2009, para. 3).  Later that 
year, the President not only promoted alternative compensation plans, but also claimed 
these reforms should be based on student test scores.  “Success should be measured by 
results . . . That’s why any state that makes it unlawful to link student progress to teacher 
evaluations will have to change its ways” (The White House, 2009, p. 3). 
In the United States, approximately 96% of public school districts, with nearly 
100% of all public school teachers, reported they used the single-salary schedule for their 
compensation system (Podgursky & Springer, 2010).  Teachers, paid according to a 
single-salary schedule, are provided salary increments according to the teacher’s years of 
experience and the teacher’s number of college or university units and degrees (Odden & 
Kelley, 2002).  The value of a single-salary compensation system is that it pays teachers 
based on quantifiable criteria, i.e., years of experience, educational credentials, and job 
titles or classifications (Webb & Norton, 2013).  The criteria are objective, measurable, 
and not subject to administrative discretion (Webb & Norton, 2013; North Dakota 
Legislative Council, 2001).  Highly paid teachers earn salaries not because they are 
necessarily exceptional teachers or have tackled tough assignments, but because they 
have accumulated seniority in school systems where pay is based on longevity (Hess, 
2004). 
 Promoting teacher quality is a key element in improving primary and secondary 
education in the United States, reported as one main goal of the current presidential 
administration requiring a “highly-qualified teacher” in every classroom (Harris & Sass, 
2011).  The quality of teaching has been shown to directly correlate with students’ ability 
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to succeed in school and in the workplace (Koppich, 2008).  A salary structure that offers 
monetary rewards based solely on inputs, much like the single-salary schedule, seems 
increasingly at odds with a system structured around educational outcomes (Kerchner, 
Koppich, & Weeres, 1997; Podgursky & Springer, 2011).  It is essential for school 
leaders to review the compensation and rewards that motivate quality teachers in the 
classroom.  
Researcher Background 
 At the time the research was conducted, the researcher was a building 
administrator at a school that hired 10 or more teachers every year.  The challenge of 
recruitment, motivation, and retention was frequently discussed at district level 
administrator meetings and during negotiations for teacher contracts.  The researcher 
conducted a study that focused on specific components of the Expectancy Theory that 
may impact teacher motivation.  This study may assist in the design and implementation 
of plans to promote the recruitment and retention of quality teachers.   
At the time the survey was conducted, the researcher was an employee of the 
school district but was not employed at any of the buildings where the survey was given.  
The position held by the researcher was that of a school administrator and not a 
classroom teacher.  Given the researcher’s position, no teachers participating in the study 
were directly connected to or influenced by the researcher.  At the completion of the 




 School leaders face great challenges to recruit, motivate, and retain teachers.  
Mandates at the federal and state level require school leaders to conduct comprehensive 
reviews of compensation in an attempt to recruit highly qualified teachers. 
Thomas B. Wilson (1999) stated:  
[C]ompanies that offer exorbitant financial packages to people find the loyalty 
and commitment are only temporary. . . .  The companies that have been 
successful in addressing the “talent issue” have placed a great deal of importance 
on their rewards systems, formal and informal. (p. 190)   
 
Satisfaction with work is a measure of the likelihood that individuals will remain 
in their jobs and is a reasonable measure of the likelihood that teachers will remain in 
teaching.  In fact, a new generation of teachers, who desire challenge, seek avenues to 
remain fresh, and seek recognition when deserved, is taking advantage of teacher-
development activities and paths for advancement (Jensen, Yamashiro, & Tibbetts, 
2010).  To meet the new job expectations, to promote job satisfaction, and to promote 
retention, schools need to explore merit-pay options (Margolis, 2008).  Addressing the 
means to motivate teachers is essential to create job satisfaction and, ultimately, to retain 
high-quality teachers.  Theories that explore employee motivation, along with how 
applying the concepts of these theories can increase the motivation of teachers, and the 
impact motivation has on student learning may provide insight for school leaders who are 
attempting to recruit and retain teachers.  Vroom’s Expectancy Theory as well as Adam’s 
Equity Theory provides school leaders with identifiable components of teacher inputs and 
outputs that may impact motivation.  Districts that offer competitive salaries and benefits 
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may be able to attract and retain well-qualified teachers, and equitable compensation 
plans help districts to maintain employees’ morale and motivation (Seyfarth, 2005).   
 Given the federal and state requirements that schools face regarding student 
performance, school districts need highly motivated and qualified teachers in the 
classroom.  When the concepts of the Expectancy Theory are applied to current practices 
for teacher motivation and compensation, the single-salary schedule may not offer the 
best means to motivate and compensate quality teachers.  This study addressed how the 
Expectancy Theory may assist school leaders when exploring teacher motivation by 
reviewing rewards and compensation. 
Purpose 
 The purpose of this study was to discern teachers’ perspectives about motivation 
and compensation utilizing Vroom’s Expectancy Theory.  This study applied the major 
components of the Expectancy Theory and directly related them to motivational aspects 
of compensation and rewards.  A comprehensive review of the theory as well as 
performance-based pay was conducted.  The study examined how teacher motivation was 
affected by changes in the expectancy, instrumentality, and valence components of the 
Expectancy Theory. 
Conceptual Framework 
“School administrators who understand human motivation will be much more 
effective in making positive differences in the school climate and in maximizing human 
potential” (Webb & Norton, 2013, p. 131).  Motivation can be classified into three 
dimensions: direction, effort, and persistence (Webb & Norton, 2013). 
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1. Direction is concerned with the pattern of choices one makes when 
choosing among all possible alternatives.  An example might be the 
teacher who continues to take courses to obtain an additional degree or 
certification. 
2. Effort refers to the behavioral indicators about how hard a person is 
working on a task.  This behavior may not be solely a function or 
motivation; rather, other variables might interfere with the teacher’s effort.  
For example, classroom interruptions caused by students or environmental 
factors may interfere with a teacher’s effort. 
3. Persistence is concerned with how long a person pursues a course of 
action.  Persistence could mean the number of years teaching or the extent 
to which a teacher is willing to keep trying a particular task. 
Understanding these three dimensions of motivation will assist school leaders in 
measuring motivation changes for teachers when applying the Expectancy Theory. 
Theories of motivation are designed to address why a person, or in the case of this 
study, a teacher, will behave in a certain way, give a certain amount of effort, or be more 
or less satisfied in his/her position. The primary theory for this study is the Expectancy 
Theory.  The Equity Theory provides a foundation for applying and understanding the 
Expectancy Theory. 
In 1963, John Stacey Adams, a workplace and behavioral psychologist, developed 
what is known as the Equity Theory, which illustrated how employees become 
demotivated when they perceive the existence of unfair treatment in the workplace 
(Webster, 2013).  Adams’ Equity Theory helped employers recognize there must be a 
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balance between what employees put into a task or job as well as the output of that task 
or job.  When applied to current teacher-compensation practices, teachers may perceive 
unfair treatment in the workplace because, even if their input changes, the output remains 
the same under a single-salary pay plan.  This outcome may create teachers who are 
demotivated. 
This researcher used the common inputs and outputs for teachers and created a 
figure demonstrating the need to create balance in the workplace as explained by the 
Equity Theory.  When there are changes in inputs or outputs, the imbalance that is 
created may lead to a decline in motivation or job satisfaction (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  Teacher Input/Output Model.  (Soupir-Fremstad, 2013). 
Based on Adam’s Equity Theory, 1963 
 
To understand the factors of the Expectancy Theory, the inputs and outputs 
described in the Equity Theory must be recognized.  The level of education, experience, 
and commitment, all inputs in the Equity Theory, are directly connected to the effort and 
instrumentality factors of the Expectancy Theory.  Compensation, recognition, and 
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rewards, all outputs in the Equity Theory, are directly connected to the valence factor of 
the Expectancy Theory.  The Equity Theory attempts to create a balance between inputs 
and outputs, and the Expectancy Theory uses these inputs and outputs to measure 
motivation. 
Vroom’s Theory of Work and Motivation, introduced in 1960, started with the 
idea that people tend to prefer certain goals or outcomes over others (Miner, 2007).  
Employees, or teachers, anticipate experiencing feelings of satisfaction if the preferred 
outcome, or goal, is achieved.  The outcome, along with satisfaction or dissatisfaction, is 
viewed solely by the individual employee.  “Thus the accumulation of earnings per se 
might be viewed as inherently satisfying to one person, but to another, it is important as a 
means to the end of buying a sports car” (Miner, 2007, p. 67).  In 1967, Porter and 
Lawler presented a model using much of Vroom’s work, but they identified variables that 
impact motivation and performance.  The Expectancy Theory addressed intrinsic and 
extrinsic rewards as a means of creating satisfaction in the workplace (Miner, 2007).  
Vroom designed the Expectancy Theory based on motivation and management in 
the workplace.  The theory suggests that employees’ perceived views of workplace 
outcomes determine the level of motivation they have when working (Redmond & Hite, 
2013).  If the organization requires an employee to demonstrate a high-level work 
product, the employee expects the outcome to be high as well.  If that expectation is met, 
the employee may be motivated to continue producing a high-level product.  However, if 
the employee inputs a high-level of effort and the outcome, or reward, is lower than 
expected, the employee may experience a reduction in motivation (see Figure 2). 
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Expectancy     X     Instrumentality     X     Valence   =   Motivation 
(Effort) x (Performance) x (Rewards) = Motivation 
 
Figure 2.  E x I x V = Motivation (Vroom, 1964). 
 
 Through the utilization of the Expectancy Theory framework, this study provided 
a better understanding about the impact that recognition and compensation have on 
teacher motivation.  Using the components of the Expectancy Theory, expectancy 
(effort), instrumentality (performance), and valence (rewards), the study examined the 
impact these factors have on teacher motivation.  The application of the Expectancy 
Theory to these components may help school leaders increase teacher motivation and, in 
turn, improve student learning. 
Research Questions 
To guide this study, the following research questions were developed: 
1. How do teachers’ perspectives of effort (hard work) impact motivation? 
2. How do teachers’ perspectives of instrumentality (the belief that 
performance will lead to a reward) impact motivation? 
3. How do teachers’ perceptions of valence (the value of the reward) impact 
motivation? 
4. What relationships among the three factors (expectancy, instrumentality, 
and valence) impact motivation? 
Definition of Terms 
Alternative compensation: Using indicators other than those utilized in the single-salary 
schedule (teacher degree and years of experience) to determine teacher pay (Rowland & 
Potemski, 2009). 
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Effort:  Conscious exertion of power: hard work.  Something produced by exertion or 
trying (“Effort,” 2012). 
Expectancy:  One component of the Expectancy Theory.  Expectancy is the belief that 
one’s effort (E) will result in attainment of desired performance (P) goals. (“Expectancy 
Theory,” 2013). 
Expectancy theory: Motivational theory based on cognitive psychology.  It proposes that 
people are motivated by their conscious expectations of what will happen if they do 
certain things and that they are more productive when they believe their expectations will 
be realized (“Expectancy Theory,” 2013). 
Equity theory: Concept that people derive job satisfaction and motivation by comparing 
their efforts (inputs) and income (outputs) with those of other people in the same or other 
firms (“Equity Theory,” 2013). 
Individual performance-based pay: System designed to link teacher or administrator pay 
to the results of a performance evaluation.  Student performance, professional 
involvement and growth, and classroom instruction could be factors viewed in a 
performance-based pay plan (Webb & Norton, 2013).   
Instrumentality:  One component of the Expectancy Theory.  Agency or means by which 
an entity accomplishes its functions, fulfills its obligations, or realizes its objectives 
(“Instrumentality,” 2013). 
Merit pay: Associated with alternative compensation from the 1980s, “merit pay” refers 
to teacher compensation that is based on either principal evaluations (old-style merit pay) 
or students’ standardized test scores (new-style merit pay; Rowland & Potemski, 2009). 
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Motivation: the act or process of motivating or the condition of being motivated 
(“Motivation,” 2012).  “Motivation is derived from the word “motive” which means 
needs, desires, wants, or drives within individuals. It is the process of stimulating people 
to action to accomplish goals” (Management Studyguide, 2012, p. 1).   
Valence:  One component of the Expectancy Theory.  Negative or positive psychological 
value assigned by a person to another person, event, goal, job, object, outcome, etc., 
based on its attractiveness to him or her (“Valence,” 2013). 
Limitations 
 It is acknowledged that the study has limitations that are common with survey 
research.  The surveyed population is not an all-inclusive sample; however, an attempt 
was made to represent common types of school-district teachers: elementary, middle 
school, and high school.  The results from the survey vary in frequency depending on the 
respondent’s completion of the question.  The frequency is listed on every table to clearly 
identify the number of respondents. 
Delimitations 
 There are several variables when reviewing expectancy, instrumentality, valence, 
and motivation.  For this study, the expectancy component focused on effort as identified 
as hard work.  The instrumentality component was teachers’ perceptions of their building 
administrator recognizing their hard work.  The valence component focused on the results 
of teachers’ hard work through rewards and recognition.  The motivation component used 




Organization of the Study 
 Chapter I provides an Introduction to the study, describes the Problem, states the 
Purpose of the study, gives the Conceptual Framework, lists the Research Questions, 
explains the Definition of Terms used throughout the dissertation, addresses the 
Limitations and the Delimitations of the study, and explains the researcher background.  
Chapter II provides a Review of Literature which addresses the Expectancy Theory and 
workplace motivation, studies that have applied the Expectancy Theory, an overview of 
Teacher-Compensation Practices, a review of performance-based pay plans, and the pros 
and cons of these plans.  Chapter III provides the Methodology of the study from survey 
design to implementation.  Chapter IV contains the analysis and synthesis of the survey 
data along with the results derived from those data.  Chapter V summarizes the study, 















 In a 2012 survey conducted by the Society for Human Resources, 44% of the 
people surveyed claimed they would likely look for a new job within the next 12 months 
(Marks Jarvis, 2012).  Job satisfaction and motivation are essential components to retain 
quality employees and to increase the effectiveness of an organization (Manzoor, 2012).  
One important factor in job satisfaction is compensation.  In that same survey, only 22% 
of the employees reported being “very satisfied” with their pay and compensation (Marks 
Jarvis, 2012).  These numbers become more alarming when reviewing teachers’ job 
satisfaction.  In the MetLife Survey of the American Teacher, conducted in 2012, only 
39% of surveyed teachers reported they were very satisfied with their current position; 
that response was down 5% from the 2011 results (Resmotivs, 2013).  “The least satisfied 
teachers are those who work in schools that have slashed budgets, and who have less time 
for collaboration with peers and professional development than teachers from other 
schools” (Resmotivs, 2013, p. 1).   
Since passage of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001, much has been done in 
the name of school reform and students’ academic performance.  School-reform efforts in 
the United States have increasingly come to focus on the identification, recruitment, 
motivation, and retention of highly effective teachers.  As such, teacher-compensation 
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plans have been the primary means of recruitment, motivation, and retention.  Despite 
ongoing debates about the adequacy of total compensation, the design of merit-pay 
systems, and the structure of pension benefits, there should be broad agreement that pay 
be designed to recruit and retain the highest-quality teachers in a cost-effective manner 
(Richwine, 2012).  If policymakers and school leaders want to get teacher pay right, they 
can no longer look at across-the-board pay raises.  Single salary compensation plans do 
nothing for the long-term recruitment, motivation, and retention of highly qualified 
teachers.  Instead, policymakers “should focus on rewarding highly qualified teachers 
with targeted salary increases” (Richwine, 2012, p. 1). 
 Teachers who are hired using the single-salary schedule for compensation not 
only know what they and all other teachers are making for their current position, but are 
also able to predict what they will make each subsequent year they are employed in that 
district.  This salary predictability does little to motivate, recognize, or reward hard work.  
Research has suggested that rewards promote employee satisfaction which directly 
influences employee performance (Manzoor, 2012).  By maintaining job satisfaction, 
school districts are more likely to effectively recruit, motivate, and retain high-quality 
teachers. 
Chapter II focuses on the literature review.  The literature was selected to provide 
a better understanding about the Expectancy Theory and workplace motivation, as well as 
how these theories explain employees’ responses to effort and hard work, recognition as a 
means of motivation, and monetary rewards as a means of motivation.  This chapter also 
gives an overview of historical trends and patterns for teacher compensation, current 
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trends for teacher compensation, and how performance-based plans are implemented in 
school districts throughout the United States.   
Motivation 
 The Expectancy Theory has important implications for motivating employees.  
Employee motivation is enhanced by altering the individual’s effort-to-performance 
expectancy, performance-to-reward expectancy, the reward valences, and/or the need to 
do all three (Lunenburg, 2011).  By recognizing the importance of motivation, school 
leaders can better understand ways to devise compensation plans that encourage the 
recruitment of highly qualified teachers, motivate teachers to continue improving 
instruction and learning in the classroom, and retain effective teachers at their schools.  
For this study, the concept of motivation is explored through the Expectancy Theory. 
Understanding Teacher Inputs and Outputs 
 In 1963, John Stacey Adams, a workplace and behavioral psychologist, developed 
a theory that illustrates how employees become demotivated when they perceive the 
existence of unfair treatment in the workplace (Webster, 2013).  Adams based his Equity 
Theory on the elements of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and Herzberg’s Two-Factor 
Theory (Webster, 2013).  The Equity Theory is a strikingly simple theory; it is comprised 
of four interlocking propositions (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978, p. 6): 
1. Individuals will try to maximize their outcomes (where outcomes equal 
rewards minus costs). 
2. a. Groups can maximize collective reward by evolving accepted systems 
for equitably apportioning resources among members.  Thus, groups will 
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evolve such equity systems, and will attempt to induce members to accept 
and adhere to these systems.   
b. Groups will generally reward members who treat others equitably and 
generally punish (increase the costs) members who treat others 
inequitably. 
3. When individuals find themselves participating in inequitable 
relationships, they will become distressed.  The more inequitable the 
relationship, the more distress individuals will feel. 
4. Individuals who discover they are in an inequitable relationship will 
attempt to eliminate their distress by restoring equity.  The greater the 
inequity that exists, the more distress they will feel and the harder they 
will try to restore equity. 
The Equity Theory, as applied in the workplace, calls for a fair balance between 
the employee’s inputs and the outputs (Webster, 2013).  To demonstrate the balance of 
inputs and outputs, the researcher created a figure utilizing common components of 
teacher inputs and outputs (see Figure 3).  Therefore, inequity, when perceived, results in 
dissatisfaction (distress) either in the form of anger (under-rewarded) or guilt (over-
rewarded).  Tension is created in proportion to the amount of inequity.  This tension, in 





Figure 3.  Teacher Input/Output Model. (Soupir-Fremstad, 2013). 
Based Adams Equity Theory. 
Figure 3 has identified the inputs and outputs experienced by teachers.  When 
school leaders attempt to motivate teachers, it is important to recognize the levels of input 
and output for staff.  If teachers perceive that a high level of work difficulty, a high level 
of education attainment, and many years of experience (inputs) are not balanced with 
high compensation, recognition, or other rewards (outputs), they perceive inequity and 
look for ways to remedy the inequity.  The ways to remedy inequity in education are 
limited and are often achieved by working less, reducing the inputs, or leaving the 
position.  Increasing the outputs can only be accomplished through school leaders and 
administrators. 
 The inputs and outputs described in the Equity Theory are directly connected to 
the factors of the Expectancy Theory.  Recognizing that the inputs identified in the 
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Equity Theory, such as experience, level of education, level of work difficulty, seniority, 
organizational commitment, and specific work skills (inputs) and compensation, 
recognition, promotion, benefits, work schedule, and office size (outputs), are all 
categorized in the factors identified in the Expectancy Theory assists in developing 
rewards that motivate teachers.  Inputs are often directly associated with the factors of 
expectancy and instrumentality while outputs are directly associated with valence.  This 
understanding is needed to help school teachers and leaders increase motivation. 
Expectancy Theory: The Creation of Motivation 
 Dr. Victor Vroom, an international expert on leadership and decision making, 
designed the Expectancy Theory based on motivation and management in the workplace.  
The theory suggests that employees’ perceived view of workplace outcomes determines 
the level of motivation they have when working (Redmond & Hite, 2013).  Vroom 
defines motivation as the force impelling a person to perform a particular action, as 
determined by the interaction of (a) the person’s expectancy the act will be followed by a 
particular outcome and (b) the valence of that outcome (Vroom, 1964).  First-level 
outcomes are the direct result of behavior (e.g., performing at a certain level or entering a 
certain work role), and people achieve their valence through their instrumentality for 
securing a second-level outcome (e.g., pay, promotion, or recognition,), which may have 
a valence in and of itself or which may have valence because it leads to other outcomes 
(Lawler III & Suttle, 1973).     
Expectancy     X     Instrumentality     X     Valence   =   Motivation 
(Effort) x (Performance) x (Rewards) = Motivation 
 
Figure 4.  E x I x V = Motivation. 
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There are three components upon which Vroom’s Expectancy Theory is based 
(Redmond & Hite, 2013).  The first is expectancy.  Expectancy is described as the belief 
that higher or increased effort will yield better performance.  This concept can be 
explained by the thinking of “If I work harder, I will make something better” (Remond & 
Hite, pp. 3-4).  Conditions that enhance expectancy include having the correct resources 
available, having the required skill set for the job, and having the necessary support to do 
the job correctly. 
The second component is instrumentality.  Instrumentality is the thought that, if 
an individual performs well, then a valued outcome will come to that individual.  Some 
things that impact instrumentality are having a clear understanding about the relationship 
between performance and outcomes, having trust and respect for people who make 
decisions about the outcomes, and seeing transparency in the process of determining the 
outcomes.  In education, instrumentality is often associated with school administrators 
and performance evaluations. 
The final component is valence.  Valence, i.e., “value,” refers to the outcomes’ 
desirability.  There are individual differences in the level of value associated with specific 
outcomes.  For example, monetary bonuses may not increase the motivation of an 
employee who prefers recognition.  Valence can be thought of as the pressure or 
importance a person puts on an outcome. In education, valence is often associated with 
compensation and recognition. 
When used in an organization, the Expectancy Theory proposes that employees 
are motivated when they feel confident that they can achieve, when they value the 
outcome of their efforts, and when they believe the reward is what was promised by the 
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organization (Agadoni, 2013).  Leaders should try to increase the belief that employees 
are capable of performing the job successfully, increase the belief that good performance 
will result in valued rewards, and increase the expected value of rewards resulting from 
the desired performance (Lunenburg, 2011). 
If a person is motivated to the degree that his/her effort will lead to an acceptable 
performance (expectancy), the performance will be rewarded (instrumentality), and that 
the value of the reward is highly positive (valence), then the level of effort will likely be 
equal to the level of performance and, in turn, that level of performance will be equal to 
the perceived level of rewards (Lunenburg, 2011) (see Figure 5).  The researcher created 
a figure to illustrate the level of motivation using the Expectancy Theory components.  
The outcome level of effort, performance, and rewards equals that of the motivation the 
employee has to continue the job.  The key in this theory “lies the expectation that action 
X leads to outcome Y” (Gratz, 2009, p. 161).  It is this expectation that impacts 
motivation and attitudes.  Vroom identified that “positive attitudes toward the job are 
conceptually equivalent to job satisfaction and negative attitudes toward the job are 
equivalent to job dissatisfaction” (Vroom, 1964, p. 99).   
 
Figure 5.  Levels of E  x  I  x   V = Level of Motivation. 
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Job Satisfaction and Compensation 
 Rewards and recognition are just two factors which can have an effect on 
teachers’ job satisfaction and motivation (Shah, Ur-Rehman, Akhtar, Zafar, & Riaz, 
2012).  There may be an important link between reward and recognition as well as 
between motivation and satisfaction.  Changes in rewards and recognition can bring a 
definite change in work motivation and job satisfaction (Ali & Ahmed, 2009). 
 In 2003, Towers Perrin surveyed more than 35,000 United States employees and 
found that base pay was ranked second and that pay raises based on performance was 
ranked eighth for attracting employees (Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette, 2004).  In a 
comparable study, Towers Watson (2012) conducted a global study on workforce 
engagement that surveyed 35,000 employees worldwide.  The number one factor listed 
for the recruitment and retention of engaged employees was base salary.  Studies 
indicated that employees respond more effectively to monetary incentives than to any 
other motivational human-resource intervention (Rynes et al., 2004). 
The relationship between motivation and job satisfaction and performance is 
clearly established: positively motivated employees are more creative, motivated, and 
satisfied.  The challenge for human resources administrators and other administrators in 
the school system is to find ways to optimize performance toward the attainment of 
system and individual goals (Webb & Norton, 2013).   
The alignment of bonuses and compensation with goal-setting and collaboration 
can lead to productivity increases and improved employee motivation (Blinder, 1990; 
Heneman III, Milanowski, & Kimball, 2007; Lawler, 1990; Markos & Sridevi, 2010).   
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 Empirical research studies support compensation plans that are established using 
the fundamental components of the Expectancy Theory, most notably instrumentality, or 
the degree to which an individual views the receipt of a reward as connected to his or her 
effort (Adkins, 2004).  Empirical research shows that the closer the perceived connection 
is between effort and the compensation reward, the more effective the reward programs 
are at motivating individuals (Heneman III et al., 2007; Lawler, 1990; Markos & Sridevi, 
2010; Odden & Kelley, 2002). 
 Kelley, Odden, Milanowski, and Heneman III (2000) developed a model for 
teacher motivation based on the Expectancy Theory.  In the model, teacher motivation is 
a function of expectancy, instrumentality, and reward value.  The more the teacher sees 
his or her work impacting student achievement, the greater the teacher’s motivation.  The 
teachers’ perceived strength of this connection between effort and student achievement is 
influenced by their efficacy and external factors such as the learning environment or 
administrative support (Kelley et al., 2000). 
 The reward, or outcome, associated with the teachers’ desired performance is also 
important.  The teacher must believe that the reward is worth the additional effort in order 
to be motivated toward the performance objective (Kelley et al., 2000).  This reward, or 
outcome, can be challenging because the extra compensation must be an amount large 
enough to be worth the perceived effort required to attain the reward (Adkins, 2004).  
Negative consequences can also provide motivation if the consequences are large enough 
to create concern.  Failure to receive a bonus, criticism from the principal, a poor 
performance evaluation, and threatened job security are all negative consequences that 
could potentially motivate teachers (Kelley et al., 2000).   
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The model developed by Kelley et al. (2000) demonstrated that performance-
based rewards are highly complex and require a great deal of teacher input to be 
successful.  Teachers must value the outcome of increased student achievement and 
believe that their effort impacts that outcome.  They must also believe that the additional 
effort is worth the potential reward or monetary outcome. 
In 2010, Dr. Jonathan Eckert, with support from the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, completed an assessment of six schools that had implemented performance-
based compensation systems using money from the federal Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF).  
Although the design and implementation of each program differed, an analysis of 
preliminary data indicated that the results were similar at each school (Eckert, 2010).  
Eckert discovered that there were six themes that emerged as a result of performance-
based compensation systems, and much like the Kelley et al. study in 2000, the factors of 
the Expectancy Theory were addressed in three of the themes in his study. 
Eckert (2010) found that the first theme, performance compensation, was most 
effective when integrated with professional development, collaboration, and evaluation as 
a comprehensive approach to system-wide improvement.  Performance compensation 
directly connected with the factor of instrumentality.  The next theme indicated that 
financial incentives reward additional work and success, but were valued as a component 
of a broader emphasis to improve teaching and learning.  This theme directly connected 
with the factors of expectancy and valence.  The third theme that connected with the 
Expectancy Theory was that schools created teacher leader positions with significant 
additional compensation to provide school-based support, evaluation, and oversight for 
instructional improvement.  This theme was directly connected to valence.   
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Throughout the study, Eckert (2010) indicated that the involvement of teachers 
and school leaders when designing the compensation systems was essential.  “Teacher 
involvement in the design and implementation of performance-based compensation 
systems improves implementation, and well-implemented performance-based plans can 
improve the school climate and collaboration” (Eckert, 2010, p. 3).  Eckert also 
recognized that bonuses can be highly motivational for goal achievement when 
implemented correctly (Eckert, 2010). 
Teacher Compensation Practices 
Teacher-compensation practices have changed little since the mid-1600s when 
Massachusetts passed the passed the Olde Deluder Satan Act of 1642.  Teachers were 
contracted and paid using taxpayer money and were often supplementally supported 
through churches and philanthropic contributions (Guthrie, Springer, Rolle, & Houck, 
2007).  During the early years of education, preference was given to male teachers over 
females, and men were often paid more because of that preference.  “In 1832 the state of 
Connecticut paid its male teachers $11 a month and its female teachers $4” (Anthony, 
1988, p. 3).   
When westward expansion began, the one-room school house emerged, and with 
it, came the room-and-board compensation model (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  The 
theory behind this model was to attract and retain high-quality teachers while maintaining 
the ability to monitor and instill a sense of community, moral character, and book 
learning.  However, as the economy shifted from an agricultural foundation toward 
industrialization, additional changes occurred in education.  A new system of 
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compensation was designed to model the factories of the late 1800s (Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007).   
The grade-based compensation model was designed to pay teachers according to 
level of skill needed to educate a child at a certain level.  Because it was believed that 
elementary-age students were easier to educate, less formal training was needed.  
Secondary students required a teacher with more skills and knowledge; therefore, those 
teachers would be paid more than the elementary teacher (Guthrie et al., 2007). Springer 
(2009) stated that the grade-based compensation model sometimes included additional 
monetary rewards triggered by annual performance reviews.  These monetary rewards 
were an early form of merit pay that often carried with it gender and racial inequities as 
well as preferential treatment for some teachers (Guthrie et al., 2007). 
  Slight changes to teacher compensation occurred throughout the 1800s, and by the 
early 1900s, Ryan (2008) contended that the first form of merit pay was used in 
Massachusetts.  “In Newton, Massachusetts, and elsewhere, salaries, were in theory, 
pegged to the knowledge, skills and abilities of various teachers” (Ryan, 2008, p. 1).  In 
reality, “teachers were not paid according to their merit but instead based on race, gender, 
or political connections” (Ryan, 2008, p. 1).   
By 1903, Pennsylvania was the first state to create a minimum teacher-
compensation law.  This act provided that a minimum wage of $35 be paid to any teacher 
in the state of Pennsylvania on a monthly basis (Spencer, 1932).  Soon, several states 
followed with legislation that set a minimum teacher salary, but these laws did nothing to 
address the inconsistencies of compensation based on skills or gender.  By the 1920s, 
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most states shifted the focus of legislation from a minimum salary and began to adopt the 
single-salary pay schedule (Ryan, 2008). 
The Single Salary Schedule 
In the early 1920s, Denver, Colorado, and Des Moines, Iowa, adopted a new 
single-salary schedule which has since become the primary model for teacher 
compensation (Springer, 2009).  Implemented as a way to limit corruption, political 
favoritism, and bias that occurred in hiring and compensation practices, the single-salary 
schedule provided a level of equality for compensation.   
Popularized following World War II when the school population burgeoned and 
teachers were in short supply, the single-salary schedule became widespread as a way of 
equalizing pay across gender, race, and position.  At the time, female teachers (most of 
whom taught at the elementary level) were paid less than male teachers (most of whom 
taught at the secondary level), and black teachers were paid less than white teachers.  
Standardizing teacher salaries was a means to attract the necessary complement of 
individuals to the profession (Koppich, 2008, p. 3). 
 The single-salary schedule provided a fair, easy-to-understand, bias-free, and 
easy-to-implement way of compensating teachers.  Teachers knew what their salaries 
would be from one year to the next with very little uncertainty (Koppich, 2008).  The 
single-salary schedule paid equivalent salaries for equivalent preparation and experience.  
This salary schedule allowed for several assumptions to be made about this type of 
compensation (Webb & Norton, 2013): 
1. Teaching of all grade levels and subjects is of equal importance and 
equally difficult. 
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2. The more professional preparation and training the teacher has, the more 
effective the teacher. 
3. The more experience the teacher has, the more effective the teacher. 
4. Salary variations are unnecessary and undesirable motivators for teachers. 
5. The single-salary schedule minimizes frictions and dissatisfaction among 
teachers. 
6. The single-salary schedule is the easiest to administer. (p. 199) 
 
This system of uniform pay based the salaries on a fixed schedule that only took 
into account the years of experience and the level of education gained by the teacher.  
The purpose was to promote longevity within a school district and to provide an incentive 
for teachers to receive additional education (Moore Johnson & Papay, 2009).  Teachers 
supported this type of compensation because it did not require individuals to compete for 
pay and because it rewarded individual efforts, such as professional development and 
training, as indicators of effectiveness (Koppich, 2008).  The single-salary schedule gave 
teachers the same access to earn a pay raise under the same set of rules.  Salary increases 
were no longer partially based on what teachers viewed as arbitrary administrative 
assessments of their merit (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  Because the schedule was easy to 
administer, it provided equity and removed arbitrary assessments of teacher merit.  
Generally speaking, the single-salary schedule worked well for school districts 
nationwide, but the single-salary schedule plan began to change with the publication of A 
Nation at Risk in 1983.   
 A Nation at Risk recommended that teacher salaries be “professionally 
competitive, market sensitive, and performance-based” (National Commission on 
Excellence in Education, 1983, p. 30).  After this report, many districts and states created 
merit-pay plans, career ladders, and other forms of compensation that differed from the 
traditional single-salary schedule.  It was during the early 1980s that a national call for 
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improving teacher performance through monetary incentives was initiated; however, 
many of these plans were short lived (Odden & Kelley, 2002). 
Merit Pay: The Early Years 
 In 1983, A Nation at Risk gave rise to the standards-based reform movement 
which turned attention from what students should be learning to assessing what students 
were learning.  Because there was a shift to measurable student outcomes, changes in 
compensation were made to pay teachers who improved student learning (Moore Johnson 
& Papay, 2009).  Merit-pay plans rose quickly in the 1980s and faded just as rapidly.  
The failings of these past merit plans were well documented (Murnane & Cohen, 1986; 
Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  Merit-pay plans were often based 
on the principal’s evaluations of teacher performance.  This subjective form of evaluation 
encouraged competition among teachers.  This discourse among teachers led to the 
failure of many plans because teachers and teacher unions were not supportive (Ryan, 
2008).   
 Another cause for failure was the lack of funding provided by government and 
school district officials during the implementation of merit-pay plans.  Districts and states 
rarely provided stable funding for such programs (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  “The 
programs are initially enacted with great expectation.  They are usually funded at below 
required levels, and then funding is eliminated in a few years at the first sign of district 
fiscal distress” (Odden & Kelley, 2002, p. 36).  
 In 1986, Murnane and Cohen found that merit programs that remained over time 
were used at wealthy school districts that had sufficient funding for the program.  The 
districts that had merit-pay plans that lasted for several years had certain common 
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characteristics: (a) Teacher morale was high; (b) merit pay was not promoted as a 
punishment for ineffective teachers; (c) community housing costs were high (indication 
of community affluence); (d) there was great support for public-school education; (e) 
teachers’ uniform salaries were high before the implementation of merit-pay plans; and 
(f) the existing evaluation plans functioned well (Murnane & Cohen, 1986).  These 
programs also had a tendency to reward a large percentage, but not all, of the teachers.  
“As a result, the programs may have been termed ‘merit programs,’ but they actually 
accorded additional pay for additional tasks in which all teachers engaged” (Odden & 
Kelley, 2002, p. 36).   
Merit Pay to Performance-Based Pay 
 The changes in educational context over the last decade have recently revived the 
calls for compensation reform.  “Increasing regulation and accountability from sources 
like the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, and competition from charter schools and 
school choice have increased pressures on districts to improve student achievement” 
(Moore Johnson & Papay, 2009, p. 12).  The compensation reforms can be categorized 
into four main types (Moore Johnson & Papay, 2009): 
1. Knowledge and skills: pay for undertaking professional development or 
acquiring skill-based credentials. 
2. Roles: pay for assuming special roles and responsibilities. 
3. Market factors: pay for teaching in hard-to-staff subjects or schools. 
4. Performance: pay for effective instructional practice and student 
achievement.  (p. 13) 
 
“Many current efforts to restructure teacher pay, including many of those funded 
by the federal Teacher Incentive Fund, focus on incentives to individual teachers for 
improved student scores on standardized tests” (Koppich, 2008, p. 12).  Other programs 
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have taken a broader approach, offering incentives for professional circumstances or 
accomplishments, improved teaching practices, market incentives (hard-to-staff schools), 
and knowledge and skills acquisition (Koppich, 2008).  As new types of compensation 
plans are introduced, there may be increased support for these plans from classroom 
teachers, politicians, and teacher associations.  
In recent years, a growing number of studies indicate that teacher attitudes toward 
compensation reform have improved (Springer & Gardner, 2010).  Coupled with support 
from national teacher associations and politicians, the new approach of performance-
based pay is gaining ground; the federal government began awarding grants, such as the 
Teacher Incentive Fund, to promote these changes (Brodsky, DeCesare, & Kramer-Wine, 
2010).  Researchers who believe student performance is the issue believe that 
compensation reform and policy should emphasize student performance (Hanushek & 
Rivkin, 2007).  Thus, performance-based pay might include student outcomes if it is to be 
effective. 
The Case for Performance-Based Compensation 
Advocates of performance-based compensation contend that, to improve the 
quality of education and the performance of students, we have to invest in teachers who 
demonstrate achievement gains.  “One of the primary challenges in improving student 
achievement and closing the achievement gap is the fact that economically disadvantaged 
students generally require more academic instruction and more effective teachers than are 
required by non-economically disadvantaged students” (Springer et al., 2007, p. 6).  
Students who are deemed most at risk for academic failure are placed with the most 
ineffective teachers.  This practice of placing at-risk students with the most ineffective 
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teachers is confirmed through required reports that are completed in compliance with the 
No Child Left Behind Act (Springer et al., 2007).  “Pay for performance in education is 
based on the premise that monetary incentives will provide schools with tools to recruit 
and retain highly-effective teachers, and help teachers focus on pedagogical and 
organization changes required to improve student learning” (Jacob & Springer, 2008,     
p. 2).  This research is supported by Goldhaber (2008) when he reported:  
[A] significant amount of this work [research on teacher attributes to student 
achievement] suggests that inputs-based strategies for improving teacher quality, 
such as changes in teacher training or licensure standards, are unlikely to yield 
significant changes in the quality of the teacher workforce due to the weak links 
between such policies and student achievement.  More recent research utilizing 
datasets that link individual teachers to their individual students is yielding new 
insights about how teachers compare to one another.  This work shows there is a 
tremendous variation in the effectiveness of teachers in the workforce. (pp. 3-4) 
 
In a 2008 working paper, Podgursky noted that a single-salary schedule does not 
allow for more effective teachers to be rewarded.  He goes on to make distinctions 
between effective and ineffective teachers:  
[S]ome fourth grade teachers are much more effective at raising student 
achievement than others.  More generally, some teachers are harder working and 
are more inspirational to students (and parents) than others.  Some teachers are 
burnt out and simply putting in time until retirement.  The single-salary schedule 
suppresses differences between more effective and less effective teachers. (pp. 8-
9)   
 
A pay system that rewards teachers based on performance will motivate teachers 
to work harder, will draw new teachers who are willing to work at meeting performance 
targets into the profession, and will retain effective teachers in schools (Podgursky, 
2008).  
 Given the need for improved student achievement, advocates for performance-
based compensation often present several reasons for its implementation.  The first 
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reason for implementing performance-based compensation is teacher effectiveness.  
Teacher effectiveness is the number one determining factor in students’ academic 
achievement and overall school experience (Sanders, Wright, & Langevin, 2008).  
Teachers respond to incentives as a reward for additional work and success, but they also 
value the improved teaching and learning that occur with an effective performance-based 
pay plan (Berry & Eckert, 2012).  Another reason for implementing performance-based 
pay plans is to link what students learn to what teachers earn.  This accountability has 
become essential to school finance.  More than 80% of any school district’s budget goes 
to compensation, and the public wants to see a connection between student outcomes and 
these expenditures (Slotnik, 2009). 
Advocates of performance-based pay also recognize that the vast majority of 
school teachers are paid on a salary schedule that is based on years of experience and 
education level.  These two variables are weakly correlated with student outcomes 
(Griffith, 2010; Sanders et al., 2008).  Proponents also argue that single-salary systems, 
“which typically reward teachers for experience and credentials alone, make teaching 
unattractive to high achieving people with technical skills and make difficult teaching 
assignments unattractive to incumbents” (Goldhaber, Dearmond, & Deburgomaster, 
2011, p. 441).  These types of teaching assignments lead into another important factor for 
performance-based pay.  Performance-based pay helps make teaching more professional 
by aligning compensation with the pay for other professionals who have similar training 
or education levels (Koppich, 2008). 
Teacher-performance incentive programs and models are designed and 
implemented in an effort to increase teacher effectiveness, to elevate students’ academic 
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achievement, to enhance school productivity, and to recruit and retain teachers (Springer, 
Ballou, & Peng, 2008).  Supporters of performance pay believe it is one way to combat 
the teacher shortages that plague hard-to-staff subject areas, high-poverty schools, and 
schools that have high percentages of racial and ethnic minorities (Koppich, 2008).  “At 
least 30 states offer financial incentives for those who teach in schools or subject areas 
that are hard to staff” (Berry & Eckert, 2012, p. 5).  A recent report from the Center for 
American Progress indicated that the large inequalities where students are taught by 
qualified teachers is related to the differentials in overall school funding and teacher 
salaries (Berry & Eckert, 2010).  These inequalities are challenging because studies show 
that quality teachers who continually work with students have students who experience 
both significant and long-lasting achievement gains (Koppich, 2008).   
The Case Against Performance-Based Compensation 
 Although the argument can be made that performance-based pay has advantages, 
many researchers have identified areas for concern in the design of pay-for-performance 
systems as well as the negative outcomes that could be generated from such systems.  In 
a 2008 working paper, Rothstein stated:  
In education, most policy makers who promote performance incentives and 
accountability seem mostly oblivious to the extensive literature in economics and 
management theory, documenting the inevitable corruption of quantitative 
indicators and the perverse consequences of performance incentives which rely on 
such [limited quantifiable] indicators.  If ignorant of this literature, proponents of 
performance incentives in education are unable to engage in careful deliberation 
about whether, in particular cases, the benefits are worth the price. (p. 79) 
 
Rothstein (2008) cited many unintended consequences of performance pay; “goal 
distortion” (p. 9) and “cream skimming” (p. 40) are created when attempts to quantify 
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and compensate based on select outcomes result in a focus that is unbalanced.  Using data 
from standardized assessments may not be reliable, causing detrimental consequences. 
 Rothstein (2008) identified schools that place an exaggerated emphasis on test 
scores (goal distortion) which may lead to teachers and school leaders manipulating 
students to prevent them from taking the test or from being identified in a certain 
subgroup.  There have been cases where teachers and administrators encourage low-
performing students to not attend school so their scores will not be counted against the 
school (cream skimming; Rothstein, 2008).  This type of test manipulation was 
discovered in Atlanta, Georgia, in 2011.  “Atlanta teachers and principals for years 
methodically altered answer sheets for students taking state tests, boosting scores and 
transforming struggling schools—and the district as a whole—into what appeared to be a 
spectacular urban success story . . .” (Samuels, 2011, p. 1).  In response to the scandal, 
United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan stated, “There are no shortcuts to 
success, and there are schools and districts across Georgia and the country that are facing 
the same expectation to perform that are making genuine progress without cheating” (as 
cited in Samuels, 2011, p. 2).  However, a string of other districts have faced accusations 
of test tampering, including Washington, DC; Baltimore; and Philadelphia.  One can 
expect that tying financial bonuses to student achievement will only increase and 
intensify this effect (Wood Coleman, 2009). 
 Opponents of performance-based pay have concerns that go beyond the scope of 
goal distortion or cream skimming which they cite as reasons for opposing performance-
based compensation practices.  The first reason for opposing performance-based 
compensation is a belief that changing the salary system is an attempt to keep teacher 
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salaries artificially depressed (Koppich, 2008).  This artificially depressed salary is 
accomplished by performance-based compensation systems that reward only the top 15-
20% of performers without making any effort to improve the quality of all teachers 
(Solomon & Podgursky, 2000).  Some performance-pay systems limit the number of 
teachers who qualify for additional pay.  Such plans penalize equally qualified teachers 
because there are not enough funds to reward all (Ornstein, Levine, & Gutek, 2011). 
Another concern for performance-based compensation plans is the impact that 
these plans have on teachers, students, and school climate.  The single-salary schedule 
does not require teachers to compete for pay.  Competition negatively impacts teacher 
collaboration and may have a negative impact on school climate and culture (Koppich, 
2008).  When money is the motivator, it may be detrimental to the health of the school 
climate and culture; some studies indicate that intrinsic motivators increase productivity 
better than extrinsic motivators (Preis, 2010). 
Another argument is that performance-pay systems rely too heavily on 
standardized tests which place limits on what is considered good teaching and could 
narrow the curriculum taught to students (Koppich, 2008).  Factors related to student 
achievement are so diverse that it is impossible to identify the teacher’s impact (Ornstein 
et al., 2011).  This diversity in student achievement is particularly true in schools where 
multiple teachers are responsible for the same student (Hanover Research, 2012).  This 
lack of capacity to measure the teacher’s actual impact may mean that some teachers are 
awarded compensation while others are not (Hanover Research, 2012).  
Those individuals opposed to performance-based compensation argue that 
guidelines for evaluating performance pay are inequitable.  The single-salary schedule is 
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unbiased, objective, and predictable (Koppich, 2008).  Evaluations are too subjective to 
use effectively (Koppich, 2008; Ryan, 2008).  Individuals who evaluate teacher merit or 
performance may favor the teachers who do not challenge district policy or seem to 
threaten the stability of the school with innovative approaches (Ornstein et al., 2011).  
Most teachers receive satisfactory evaluations with few distinctions in overall quality, but 
there is typically not a method of distinction or recognition for those teachers who are 
truly excellent (Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009). 
Even with performance incentives, teachers tend to prefer not to work in 
disadvantaged schools, and this trend appears to be strengthened when there are no 
additional monetary incentives at these schools (Vigdor, 2008).  If the only measure of 
performance incentives is hard-to-staff schools or subject areas, there is a risk that 
teachers may only focus on those students just under the threshold of proficiency, 
ignoring those students at the highest and lowest performance levels (Preis, 2010).  
Due to recent shifts in teacher and teachers’ union attitudes regarding 
performance pay, more school leaders and politicians are reviewing compensation 
options.  With additional pressures from the No Child Left Behind legislation as well as 
the implementation of the Common Core State Standards, high-quality teachers are 
needed to improve student achievement (Koppich, 2008).  Performance-based 
compensation may provide districts with incentives to recruit, motivate, and retain high-
quality teachers. 
Performance-Based Pay Systems: Design and Implementation 
In her 2008 working paper, Koppich outlined 10 factors that contribute to 
developing and implementing new forms of teacher compensation: 
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1. Are designed to meet multiple challenges. 
2. May include multiple options for teachers to advance in pay. 
3. Represent joint union-management undertakings. 
4. Include some form of opt-in. 
5. Are not punitive. 
6. Do not include quotas. 
7. Retain at least echoes of the standard salary scale. 
8. Reflect careful planning and transparency. 
9. Are about capacity building. 
10. Do not adopt a one-size-fits all approach. (pp. 20-21) 
 
Ritter and Jensen (2010) suggested there are five essential elements to develop 
and implement a merit-pay plan in schools.  First, school districts must generate teacher, 
staff, and administrator support.  To gain this support requires collaboration and input 
from all stakeholders.     
Second, schools must develop rewards that motivate teachers in productive ways.  
School and teacher goals must be realistic, measurable, and attainable.  The rewards must 
match the amount of additional work teachers will need to do to meet the goals.  The 
program must be sustainable; if it will only happen for one year, teachers will not be 
motivated. 
Third, schools must make the merit-pay program part of a comprehensive school-
improvement strategy.  School leaders must provide all staff members with current 
student performance data and practice continuous performance monitoring. 
Fourth, schools must create a merit-pay program that promotes and encourages 
collaboration.  Promoting and encouraging collaboration reinforces the idea that everyone 
in the school is responsible for teaching and student learning.  The increased 
collaboration will enhance school climate and culture. 
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Finally, schools must employ multiple measures of teacher effectiveness.  
Teachers should be rewarded for taking additional classes, earning additional 
certifications, improving student test scores, mentoring new teachers, etc.  The program 
should be a reward and should not be punitive. 
No performance-based plan should be designed with a single focus in mind 
(raising student test scores); rather, plans should be designed to meet multiple goals 
(Koppich, 2008):   
These include encouraging high quality teachers to take on challenging 
assignments, enhancing the capacity of teachers to improve their practice (and use 
teaching strategies that research suggests are likely to improve student 
achievement), developing means for teachers to use leadership skills without 
having to leave teaching, and improving the levels of student learning. (p. 21) 
 
Performance-Based Pay Plans: Current Models 
ProComp (Denver) 
 In March of 2004, 59% of the members of the Denver Classroom Teacher 
Association voted in favor of full implementation of ProComp, a pay-for-performance 
compensation plan (Gonring, Teske, & Jupp, 2007).  The teacher association vote was 
followed by a 2005 vote by Denver citizens that raised the mill levy to support an 
additional $25 million annually to fund the ProComp plan (Brodsky et al., 2010).  The 
first full year of implementation happened during the 2006-2007 school year; the 
program was voluntary for teachers hired prior to January 2006 but was mandatory for 
individuals hired after that date.   
The ProComp program consists of four key components to determine eligibility 
for financial incentives: professional development of teacher knowledge and skills, 
professional evaluations, market incentives, and student growth (Brodsky et al., 2010).  
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Teachers were able to determine if they wanted to pursue one or several of the 
components.  Teachers in hard-to-staff schools and/or subjects earned a 3% bonus.  
Meeting one annual student growth objective earns a 1% bonus while meeting two annual 
student growth objectives earns a 2% bonus, both above the base teaching salary 
(Koppich, 2008).  Excluding the incentives for an advanced degree, an individual teacher 
stands to gain upwards of $5,000 per year by meeting all the criteria (Goldhaber, 2009). 
Some initial findings were reported after a 2008 evaluation.  Just over half (55%) 
of the participating teachers believed the program increased their engagement in relevant 
professional-development activities; about half of the participating teachers believed that 
ProComp was consistent with school district goals; and 31% of the participating teachers 
reported they were being compensated fairly when compared to their peers (Brodsky et 
al., 2010).  There were no data that would indicate any major changes to student 
performance during the first year of implementation.  Stakeholders involved in designing 
ProComp are now responsible for administering it.  The system is a result of persistence, 
tenacity, inventiveness, and innovation (Gonring et al., 2007). 
Q Comp (Minnesota) 
 In 2004, the Minnesota Federation of Teachers worked with then Governor Tim 
Pawlenty to create a partnership with the Milken Family Foundation.  This partnership 
sparked the 2005 legislation that designed and enacted the Q Comp program for the state 
of Minnesota (Brodsky et al., 2010).  Q Comp is a voluntary program that allows school 
districts to design new pay plans and to receive additional state funding to implement the 
plans.  Plans must include a career ladder (teacher-advancement option), job-embedded 
professional development, improved professional evaluation, performance pay, and a new 
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salary schedule (Koppich, 2008).  Because it is based on the federal Teacher 
Advancement Program (TAP), Q Comp has created several career-ladder models that 
promote instructional leadership (Jerald, 2009).  The focus of Q Comp is not on 
individual classroom student performance; rather, it places emphasis on school 
performance as a whole. 
 The program encourages career-advancement options that allow master teachers 
to become instructional leaders, or mentors, who will guide novice teachers to better 
practice:   
The program offers an incentive to accomplished teachers to act as a leadership 
resource within their respective districts, thereby recognizing that master teachers 
contribute not only through the classrooms they directly teach but also through 
teaching in other teachers’ classrooms, which they help to improve. (Brodsky et 
al., 2010, p. 216) 
 
 In the 2008-2009 academic year, 44 school districts and 28 charter schools had Q 
Comp programs.  Larger school districts created these programs at a much faster rate than 
smaller districts (Brodsky et al., 2010).  In a January 2009 evaluation conducted for the Q 
Comp program, evaluators found that there was a positive relationship between the 
number of years a school district participated in the Q Comp program and student 
performance (Brodsky et al., 2010).  Collaboration between teachers and administrators 
has increased, and there was more focus around instruction, planning, and professional 
development (Koppich, 2008).   
Summary 
School-reform efforts in the United States have increasingly come to focus on the 
identification, recruitment, motivation, and retention of highly effective teachers.  As 
such, teacher-compensation plans have been the primary means of recruitment, 
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motivation, and retention.  Despite ongoing debates about the adequacy of total 
compensation, the design of merit-pay systems, and the structure of pension benefits, 
there is broad agreement by school leaders, policymakers, and teachers that pay should be 
designed to recruit and retain the highest-quality teachers in a cost-effective manner 
(Richwine, 2012).   
If policymakers and school leaders want to get teacher pay right, they can no 
longer look only at across-the-board pay raises.  These compensation plans do nothing for 
the long-term recruitment, motivation, and retention of highly qualified teachers.  Instead, 
policymakers “should focus on rewarding highly qualified teachers with targeted salary 
increases” (Richwine, 2012, p. 1). 
The relationship between motivation and job satisfaction, and performance is 
clearly established: positively motivated employees are more creative, motivated, and 
satisfied.  The challenge for human resources administrators and other administrators in 
the school system is to find ways to optimize performance toward the attainment of 
system and individual goals (Webb & Norton, 2013). 
The alignment of bonuses and compensation with goal-setting and collaboration 
can lead to productivity increases and improved employee motivation (Blinder, 1990; 
Goldhaber, 2009; Heneman III et al., 2007; Lawler, 1990). 
 Through the use of common components in a performance-based pay evaluation 
(teacher effort, administrator evaluation, and recognition/reward), the study looks to 
measure the impact that these components have on teacher motivation.  Applying the 
Expectancy Theory to these components may help school leaders increase teacher 
motivation and, in turn, improve student learning. 
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Description of Chapter III 
 Chapter III provides the Methodology used to conduct the research.  A review of 
the Research Questions is provided as well as an overview of quantitative research 
methods and limitations.  A summary of the survey population, the method of collecting 












When addressing school-reform issues, one should consider the importance of 
teachers’ effort, motivation, and job satisfaction.  Current compensation plans consist of a 
single-salary schedule which allows teachers to know their exact compensation given 
their level of education and years of service to the school district.  This compensation 
method is contrary to the fundamental concepts of the Expectancy Theory and the 
components of the Equity Theory.   
Teachers’ perceptions about their personal effort and the impact it has on student 
performance, as well as additional rewards, may increase motivation and job satisfaction.  
Performance-based compensation allows school districts to have flexibility to 
compensate teachers in addition to the contracted salary.  These compensation plans often 
focus on student-performance outcomes and encourage innovative instruction that 
increases student learning.  Understanding teachers’ perceptions of expectancy (effort), 
instrumentality (recognition), and valence (rewards) provides school leaders with 
information to determine the effectiveness of performance-based plans in the school 
districts. 
Research Questions 
The following research questions guide the research: 
44 
1. How do teachers’ perspectives of effort (hard work) impact motivation? 
2. How do teachers’ perspectives of instrumentality (the belief that 
performance will lead to a reward) impact motivation? 
3. How do teachers’ perceptions of valence (the value of the reward) impact 
motivation? 
4. What relationships among the three factors (expectancy, instrumentality, 
and valence) impact motivation? 
Research Methodology 
 The research conducted for this study was quantitative.  Creswell (2005) defined 
quantitative research as an inquiry approach that is useful for describing trends and 
explaining the relationships among variables found in the literature.  Quantitative 
research may be less useful for exploring new concepts or documenting a research 
participant’s personal views (Johnson & Christensen, 2012).  Quantitative research tends 
to focus too much on the researcher’s personal view of education and can create a 
contrived situation where the research participant is taken out of context (Creswell, 
2005).   
The primary procedure for quantitative research is survey design.  This researcher 
administered a survey to a small group of teachers, within the Fargo Public School 
District, in order to identify the attitudes, opinions, behaviors, and characteristics of a 
large group of teachers.  As in quantitative research, a survey is administered to a small 
group of people (sample) in order to identify certain attitudes, opinions, behaviors, and 
characteristics for a larger group of people (population); (Creswell, 2005).  The selection 
of subjects consisted of identifying three grade levels of schools in the district: one 
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elementary school, one middle school, and one high school.  The survey instrument was 
administered using the Qualtrics program, available through the University of North 
Dakota, using an email invitation to classroom teachers at each building.   
Description of Research Population 
 Fargo Public Schools is one of the largest school districts in the state of North 
Dakota, serving over 10,800 students.  The district is comprised of 14 elementary 
schools, three middle schools, three comprehensive high schools, and 1 alternative high 
school.  The district-level administration is located in downtown Fargo and consists of 
the superintendent, assistant superintendents, directors, and other district support staff.  
Just over 950 certified teachers are employed throughout the district, and they work 
directly with building-level administration.  All teachers are contracted on a single-salary 
schedule that is negotiated by the school board and the Fargo Education Association.  
There is no alternative compensation plan for classroom teachers. 
 The building sites were selected based on the number of teachers in the building 
and the number of students served in the building.  An elementary school, a middle 
school, and a high school were selected.  A total of 198 teachers were invited to complete 
the survey.  The survey population included 50 classroom teachers at the elementary 
school, 70 classroom teachers at the middle school, and 78 classroom teachers at the high 
school.  Student enrollment was 491 at the elementary school (grades K-5), 758 at the 
middle school (grades 6-8), and 955 at the high school (grades 9-12).  Class size ranged 
from 20-24 students at the elementary, from 22-28 at the middle level, and from 22-30 at 




 The survey instrument was designed using two comparable studies that measured 
teacher perceptions about compensation plans.  Adkins’ (2004) study, Teacher 
Performance Pay: The Perceptions of Certified School-Based Personnel, used a 
questionnaire titled “Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey” in which 28 items 
were developed to address teachers’ perceptions about compensation.  The survey used a 
five-point rating scale: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree.  
The survey was tested for reliability and validity using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha 
(Adkins, 2004).  The survey consisted of five parts, each measuring the teachers’ 
perspectives of performance pay.  In Parts III and IV of the survey, teachers were asked 
questions directly related to teacher effort and motivation.  These questions connected 
with two factors of the Expectancy Theory and served as a guide to compose items in the 
survey used for this study.   
In 2008, Huth completed a study titled Teacher Attitudes Toward Alternative 
Forms of Compensation Beyond the Traditional Single Salary Schedule.  The survey 
consisted of 21 items.  Seven items in the survey were demographic, and an additional 14 
items were rated using a 5-point rating scale: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor 
Disagree, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree.  Two field-test groups were used to determine 
validity and reliability.  The study had teachers respond to statements about 
compensation on a five-point scale.  The demographic information gathered for that study 
served as a guide for the demographic information used in this study’s survey.  Each 
study measured teacher perceptions about compensation practices, and each survey used 
a Likert scale.   
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Using the survey instruments from the two studies as a guide for this study, the 
researcher designed survey questions that identified components of the Expectancy 
Theory.  The researcher designed survey questions that addressed expectancy (Question 
6, effort), instrumentality (Question 7, administration), and valence (Questions 8 and 9).  
The survey was reviewed by two faculty members at the University of North Dakota, and 
feedback was used to modify survey questions.  A pilot group of teachers, 14 in total, 
read the survey and provided additional feedback to the researcher.   
The survey consisted of two sections: Section I: Demographic Information and 
Section II: Perceptions of Motivation, Recognition, and Reward.  Teacher responses in 
Section II used a four-point Likert scale.  The ratings were as follows: Questions 6 and 7 
were (1) Not Confident, (2) Somewhat Confident, (3) Confident, and (4) Very Confident.  
Questions 8 and 9 were (1) Not Likely, (2) Somewhat Likely, (3) Likely, and (4) Very 
Likely.  A high score for the responses indicated a favorable perception, and a low score 
indicated a negative perception about each question.  The survey was conducted using the 
online survey tool Qualtrics through the University of North Dakota.   
 Questions 1-5 collected demographic data about classroom teachers.  
Teachers were asked their gender, their number of years of teaching 
experience, the highest level of education attained, and the current school 
assignment (elementary school, middle school, and high school).   
 Question 6 asked teachers to identify how likely their own effort impacts 
student learning.  The Expectancy Theory provided the basis for this 
question because the theory suggests that teachers’ perceptions about the 
likelihood of a desired outcome impact the teachers’ performance level.  
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The expectancy component of the theory was addressed in this question 
about teacher effort. 
 Question 7 asked teachers to identify how likely they believed their 
administrator would be to reward them for their effort.  The Expectancy 
Theory suggested that external variables can impact motivation and effort.  
The instrumentality component of the theory was addressed in this 
question about school administrators. 
 Question 8 asked teachers to identify how likely they would be to increase 
their effort for social recognition.  The Expectancy Theory suggested that 
the outcome must be significant enough to increase effort and motivation.  
The valence component of the theory was addressed in this question about 
social recognition. 
 Question 9 asked teachers to identify how likely they would be to increase 
their effort for additional compensation.  The Expectancy Theory 
suggested that the outcome must be significant enough to increase effort 
and motivation.  The valence component of the theory was addressed in 





Survey Item Purpose, Theoretical Base, and Research Focus. 
 
Questions Purpose Theoretical Base Research Question(s) 
 
Part I         (1-5) 
 







Part II        (6) Effort Expectancy Theory 1 
    
                  (7) Recognition Expectancy Theory 2 
    
                  (8 & 9) 
 











Collection of Data 
 Upon creating the survey, Dr. Robert Grosz, Assistant Superintendent of 
Curriculum and Instruction with Fargo Public Schools, was contacted, and permission 
was obtained to conduct the survey at three school buildings in the district (see Appendix 
A).  The IRB at the University of North Dakota, as well as the committee members, 
granted approval to conduct the study (see Appendix B & C).  
An email, requesting participation to complete the survey, was sent to the 198 
building teachers on May 21, 2013 (see Appendix D). The email to teachers consisted of 
a greeting, the purpose of the survey, and a link to the survey.  It was also noted that the 
survey was confidential and voluntary; no teacher names would be used, and the schools 
would not be identified in the study.  Directions for completion were provided on the 
survey form.  The teachers had one week to complete the survey.  A follow-up email was 
sent on May 26, 2013, providing a thank you to individuals who had completed the 
survey and encouraging those who had not completed the survey to do so prior to the 
survey document being closed (see Appendix E). At the end of the week, the survey link 
was closed, and the survey information was collected; 131 teachers answered at least one 
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question on the survey.  Frequency numbers varied by question and are identified for 
each question in the analysis provided in Chapter IV. 
Data Analysis 
 Inferential statistical analysis was conducted.  The data analysis was designed to 
address the four research questions using the two sections of the survey:  Section I:  
Demographics and Section II:  Perceptions of Motivation, Recognition, and Reward. 
 Research Questions 1, 2, and 3 have data presented in two ways.  The first data 
set is the frequencies with which teachers responded to the questions.  Frequency 
information provides the overall positive or negative perceptions for each question.  
Categorical data are shared in frequency and percentage form.  Tables are used to support 
the numerical data.  ANOVA data are presented to identify relationships and correlations 
among the Expectancy Theory factors and demographic information.  The relationships 
between the factors of the Expectancy Theory and demographics provide methods in 
which school leaders can attempt to increase teacher motivation.  Tables and numeric 
data are presented to address the ANOVA analysis. 
 Research Question 4 addresses the relationships, or correlations, among the 
factors of the Expectancy Theory.  Spearman rho analysis is conducted to determine 
significance between the factors of expectancy, instrumentality, and valence.  The 
numeric data are presented in a data table to demonstrate correlations or significant 
relationships.   
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Description of Chapter IV 
 In Chapter IV, the data are presented.  The analysis discerns teachers’ perceptions 
about individual effort and the possible impact it has on student performance and 
personal motivation.  The data analysis also discerns teachers’ perceptions of rewards and 
recognition as well as the value of each perception when used to increase effort and 














The purpose of this study was to discern teachers’ perspectives of motivation and 
compensation utilizing Vroom’s Expectancy Theory.  The researcher applied the major 
components of the Expectancy Theory and to relate them to motivational aspects of 
compensation and rewards.  This chapter presents quantitative data analysis and the 
results in the following sections: 
1. How do teachers’ perspectives of effort (hard work) impact motivation? 
2. How do teachers’ perspectives of instrumentality (the belief that performance will 
lead to a reward) impact motivation? 
3. How do teachers’ perceptions of valence (the value of the reward) impact 
motivation? 
4. What relationships among the three factors (expectancy, instrumentality, and 
valence) impact motivation?   
Frequency Data Section I: Demographic Information 
A total of 198 teachers (50 classroom teachers at the elementary school, 70 
classroom teachers at the middle school, and 78 classroom teachers at the high school) 
were invited to complete the survey.  Of the 198 teachers who were invited to complete 
the survey, 128 teachers (66%) began the survey; however, not all respondents completed 
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the entire survey.  Respondents who completed any of the survey questions are included 
in the frequency data presented for individual questions. Therefore, frequency numbers 
vary for some survey questions and are listed for each data set.   
When frequency data are presented, the total number of respondents is given.  A 
total of 128 teachers responded to the question about gender: 45 males (35%) and 83 
females (65%).  The years of experience ranged from fewer than 3 years to 21 years or 
more.  For statistical purposes, the years of experience were categorized into 4 groups:  
fewer than 3 years had 12 respondents (9.4%); 3-10 years had 37 respondents (28.9%); 
11-20 years had 36 respondents (28.1%); and 21 or more years had 43 respondents 
(33.6%) (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
 
Gender and Level of Education (N=128) 
 
Variable  Respondents Percentage 
Gender    
Female 83  65.0 
Male 45  35.0 
    
Years of Teaching     
Fewer than 3 Years 12  9.4 
3 to 10 Years 37  28.9 
11 to 20 Years 36  28.1 
21 or More Years 43  33.6 
 
 The level of education for each respondent was also categorized for statistical 
purposes.  Those categories were as follows: Baccalaureate had 53 respondents (41.4%); 
Master’s had 71 respondents (55.5%); Specialist had 2 respondents (1.6%); and 
Doctorate had 2 respondents (1.6%).   
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 In addition to the level of education attained by the respondents, the current 
teaching assignment was obtained.  The current teaching assignment was categorized for 
statistical purposes into three categories: Elementary School had 34 respondents (26.6%); 
Middle School had 41 respondents (32%); and High School had 53 respondents (41.4%) 
(see Table 3). 
Table 3 
 
Frequency Table: Level of Education and Teaching Assignment (N=128) 
 
Variable  Numbers Percentage 
Level of Education    
Baccalaureate 53  41.4 
Master’s 71  55.5 
Specialist 2    1.6 
Doctorate 2    1.6 
    
Teaching Assignment     
Elementary School 34  26.6 
Middle School 41  32.0 
High School 53  41.4 
 
To summarize the demographic information for this study, there were more 
females than males who responded.  The years of experience were evenly distributed in 
three of the four categories with the “fewer than three years of experience” category 
making up less than 10% of the respondents.  Nearly all respondents held a bachelor’s or 
master’s degree, with only four respondents reporting they held a specialist or doctoral 
degree.  The number of teacher respondents at each school equaled more than 50% of the 
total staff.  The number of respondents was as follows: the elementary school had 50 
teachers, and 34 of them (68%) responded to the survey; the middle school had 70 
teachers, and 41 of them (59%) responded to the survey; and the high school had 78 
teachers, and 53 of them (68%) responded to the survey. 
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Frequency Data Section II: Perceptions of Motivation, Recognition, and Reward 
The second section of the survey consisted of four questions, Survey Questions 6, 
7, 8, and 9, with a focus on perceptions about effort, administration, recognition, and 
compensation.  The teachers were asked to respond given a four-point Likert scale with 
the response for questions about effort (Question 6) and administration (Question 7) 
being (1) Not confident, (2) Somewhat Confident, (3) Confident, and (4) Very Confident.  
The response/options for questions about recognition (Question 8) and compensation 
(Question 9) used a four-point Likert scale with the following range: (1) Not Likely, (2) 
Somewhat Likely, (3) Likely, and (4) Very Likely.  The number of respondents changed 
for each question and is identified in the data presented. 
 Question 6 asked teachers to respond about their level of confidence that their 
hard work (effort) would increase student performance.  A total of 119 teachers 
responded to the question: Not Confident had 1 respondent (.8%); Somewhat Confident 
had 24 respondents (20.2%); Confident had 63 respondents (52.9%); and Very Confident 
had 31 respondents (26.1%) (see Table 4). 
Table 4 
 
Frequency Data: Question 6 Effort (N=119) 
 
Variable  Frequency Percentage 
Effort    
Not Confident 1  .8 
Somewhat Confident 24  20.2 
Confident 63  52.9 
Very Confident 31  26.1 
Total Respondents 119  100.0 
 
Question 7 asked teachers to respond about their level of confidence that their 
building administrator would reward them for their hard work.  A total of 120 teachers 
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responded to this question: Not Confident had 30 respondents (25%); Somewhat 
Confident had 38 respondents (31.7%); Confident had 45 respondents (37.5%); and Very 
Confident had 7 respondents (5.8%) (see Table 5). 
Table 5 
 
Frequency Data: Question 7 Administration (N=120) 
 
Variable  Frequency Percentage 
Administration    
Not Confident 30  25.0 
Somewhat Confident 38  31.7 
Confident 45  37.5 
Very Confident 7  5.8 
Total Respondents 120  100.0 
 
 Question 8 asked teachers to respond with the likelihood they would increase their 
effort if the outcome led to social recognition.  A total of 118 teachers responded: Not 
Likely had 51 respondents (43.2%); Somewhat Likely had 42 respondents (35.6%); 




Frequency Data: Question 8 Recognition (N=118) 
 
Variable  Frequency Percentage 
Recognition    
Not Likely 51  43.2 
Somewhat Likely 42  35.6 
Likely 18  15.3 
Very Likely 7  5.9 
Total Respondents 118  100.0 
 
Question 9 asked teachers to respond about the likelihood they would increase 
their effort if the outcome led to additional compensation.  A total of 119 teachers 
responded: Not Likely had 29 respondents (24.4%); Somewhat Likely had 33 
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respondents (27.7%); Likely had 39 respondents (32.8%); and Very Likely had 18 
respondents (15.1%) (see Table 7). 
Table 7 
 
Frequency Data: Question 9 Compensation (N=119) 
 
Variable  Frequency Percentage 
Compensation    
Not Likely 29  24.4 
Somewhat Likely 33  27.7 
Likely 39  32.8 
Very Likely 18  15.1 
Total Respondents 119  100.0 
 
Analysis of Survey Data 
 Survey responses that were categorical data (i.e., gender, educational experience, 
education level, and school assignment) were applied as factors for effort, perceived 
school administrator effectiveness, social recognition, and compensation motivation.  A 
computed Shapiro-Wilk test was conducted to determine whether responses were 
normally distributed.  The computed statistics were all significant (p < .05), indicating 
that the distribution of responses was significantly different than the normal distribution 
(i.e., results not normal) (see Table 8).  These two conditions, some survey item 
responses being categorical and others not normally distributed, with responses to the 
survey items indicated the need for a non-parametric statistical test.  The Kruskal-Wallis 
non-parametric test for ranked and not normally distributed data was selected as an 





Tests of Normality 
 
                                                  Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. 
Effort .818  116 <.001 
Administrator .858  116 <.001 
Recognition .802  116 <.001 
Compensation .872  116 <.001 
Lilliefors Significance 
Correction 
   
 
Research Question 1 
How do teachers’ perspectives of effort (hard work) impact motivation?  This 
research question was answered using Survey Question 6 which asks teachers to rate their 
level of confidence that their effort impacts student performance.  Frequency data 
indicated that, of the 119 teachers who responded to the question, most (63) teachers 
(52.9%) said that they were Confident that their effort would impact student performance.  
An additional 31 teachers (26.1%) indicated that they were Very Confident that their 
effort would impact student performance.  Twenty-four teachers (20.2%) indicated that 
they were Somewhat Confident that their effort would impact student performance.  One 
teacher (.8%) responded that he/she was Not Confident his/her effort would impact 
student performance (see Table 4).   
Survey Question 6 asked respondents to rate the impact of their hard work on 
student performance.  Non-significant Kruskal Wallis statistics for effort with gender (H 
(3) = .708, p = .871), effort with experience (H (3) = 2.170, p = .538), effort with 
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education attained (H (3) = 1.730, p = .630), and effort with current teaching assignment 
(H (3) = 1.650, p = .647) indicated no significant differences in the effort variable for any 
of the demographic factors (see Table 9). 
Table 9 
 





 Gender Experience Education Assignment 
H .708 2.170 1.731 1.657 
Df 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Asymp.Sig. .871 .538 .630 .647 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Effort 
 
Research Question 2 
How do teachers’ perspectives of instrumentality (the belief that performance will 
lead to a reward) impact motivation?  This research question was answered using Survey 
Question 7 which asks teachers to rate their level of confidence in their building-level 
administrator rewarding their effort.  Frequency data indicated that, of the 120 teachers 
who responded to the question, 45 teachers (37.5%) said that they were Confident that 
their building-level administrator would reward their effort.  An additional seven teachers 
(5.8%) indicated they were Very Confident that their building-level administrator would 
reward their effort.  Thirty-eight teachers (31.7%) indicated that they were Somewhat 
Confident their building-level administrator would reward their effort.  Thirty teachers 
(25%) indicated they were Not Confident their building-level administrator would reward 










 Gender Experience Education Assignment 
H 2.396 4.346 .673 2.823 
Df 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Asymp.Sig. .494 .226 .879 .420 
c. Kruskal Wallis Test 
d. Grouping Variable: Administrator 
 
Non-significant Kruskal Wallis statistics for administration with gender (H (3) = 
2.396, p = .494), administration with experience (H (3) = 4.346, p = .226), administration 
with education attained (H (3) = .673, p = .879), and administration with current teaching 
assignment (H (3) = 2.823, p = .420) indicated no significant changes in the administrator 
variable for any of the demographic factors (see Table 10). 
Research Question 3 
How do teachers’ perceptions of valence (the value of the reward) impact 
motivation?  This research question was answered using data from two survey questions.  
Survey Question 8 asked teachers to rate the likelihood that they would change their 
effort if they received social recognition.  Frequency data illustrated that, of the 118 
teachers who responded to the question, 51 of them (43.2%) indicated that they were Not 
Likely to increase their effort for social recognition.  An additional 42 teachers (35.6%) 
indicated that they were Somewhat Likely to increase their effort for social recognition.  
Eighteen teachers (15.3%) indicated that they were Likely to increase their effort for 
social recognition, and seven teachers (5.9%) indicated that they were Very Likely to 
increase their effort for social recognition (see Table 6). 
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Survey Question 8 used a non-significant Kruskal Wallis statistics for recognition 
with gender (H (3) = 2.786, p = .426), recognition with education attained (H (3) = 3.652, 
p = .302), and recognition with current teaching assignment (H (3) = 5.987, p = .112), 
and the responses indicated no significant changes in the recognition variable for the 
demographic factors of gender, education attained, and current teaching assignment.  
However, significant findings for recognition with experience (H (3) = 8.626, p = .035) 
indicated differences in the recognition variable for experience (see Tables 11 and 12). 
Table 11 
 





 Gender Experience Education Assignment 
Chi-square 2.786 8.626 3.652 5.987 
Df 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Asymp.Sig. .426 .035 .302 .112 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 


















EXPERIENCE      
Fewer than 3 
years 
 4  3  3  1  11 
3 to 10 years  12  12  7  3  34 
11 to 20 years  13  13  7  2  35 
















Mann-Whitney tests were computed to follow-up on the significant Kruskal 
Wallis test results in the recognition with experience category.  In keeping with 
minimizing effects of multiple post-hoc comparisons, a Bonferroni correction was 
applied (alpha/number of comparisons), and the alpha for these post-hoc tests was set to 
.0083.  The Not Likely and Likely levels of recognition differed for experience (medians 
“11 to 20 years” and “3 to 10 years,” respectively; U = 273.50, df =p < .008) (see  
Table 11).  At the lowest experience level, most teachers (63%) report being “Not 
Likely” or only “Somewhat Likely” to increase their effort for social recognition and the 
percentage increases with experience. 
Research Question 3 was also answered using data collected from Question 9 on 
the survey.  Survey Question 9 asked teachers to rate the likelihood they would change 
their effort if they received additional compensation.  Frequency data showed that, of the 
119 teachers who responded to the question, 39 of them (32.8%) indicated they were 
Likely to increase their effort for additional compensation.  An additional 18 teachers 
(15.1%) indicated they were Very Likely to increase their effort for additional 
compensation.  Thirty-three teachers (27.7%) indicated they were Somewhat Likely to 
increase their effort for additional compensation, and 29 teachers (24.4%) indicated that 
they were Not Likely to increase their effort for additional compensation (see Table 7). 
Survey Question 9 used a Kruskal Wallis statistics for compensation with gender 
(H (3) = 1.48, p = .686), compensation with experience (H (3) = 6.42, p = .093), 
compensation with education attained (H (3) = 1.57, p = .665), and compensation with 
current teaching assignment (H (3) = .741, p = .864).  The results indicated no significant 
changes in the recognition variable for any of the demographic factors (see Table 13). 
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Table 13 





 Gender Experience Education Assignment 
H 1.485 6.415 1.574 .741 
Df 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Asymp.Sig. .686 .093 .665 .864 
c. Kruskal Wallis Test 
d. Grouping Variable: Compensation 
 
Research Question 4 
What relationships among the three factors (expectancy, instrumentality, and 
valence) impact motivation? This research question was answered using Survey 
Questions 6-9 which addressed each component of the Expectancy Theory.  Using the 
Spearman’s rho test for correlation of ranked data, each pair of factors was analyzed for 
association.  Correlation could be significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).   
 An analysis of the data determined two significant relationships among the four 
factors.  The relationship of effort with administrator was statistically significant 
(Spearman’s rho (n = 119) = .298, p = < .05).  Teachers’ perceptions of the value of their 
effort was positively related to their belief their administrator would recognize their 
effort.  The relationship of recognition with compensation was statistically significant 
(Spearman’s rho (n= 117) = .630, p< .05) (see Table 14).  Teachers’ likelihood of 
increasing effort for social recognition was positively related to their likelihood of 
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 This chapter presented an analysis of the quantitative data results from the survey 
titled Expectancy Theory: Teachers’ perspectives of motivation and compensation.  The 
survey was used to determine teachers’ overall perception regarding increased motivation 
and compensation.  Frequency data varied for each survey question to accurately depict 
the number of respondents for individual questions.  Of the 198 teachers invited to 
complete the survey, 131 of them (66.1%) responded to at least one survey question 
while 128 of the (64.6%) completed Section I of the survey which consisted of 
demographic data.  Section II of the survey had four factors and responses for each factor 
as follows: Effort had 119 (60.1%) responses; administrator recognition had 119 (60.1%) 
responses; social recognition had 118 (59.6%) responses; and financial compensation had 
119 (60.1%) responses. 
 Research Questions 1, 2, and 3 addressed teachers’ perceptions about the 
components of the Expectancy Theory: effort, instrumentality, valance, and how each 
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component impacts motivation.  Frequency data were used to give a summary of 
teachers’ perceptions about effort, confidence in administrator effectiveness, social 
recognition, and compensation.  To determine if there was a relationship between the 
demographic data and the factors of effort, administrator effectiveness, social 
recognition, and compensation, Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric tests were conducted, and 
Mann-Whitney tests were used when post-hoc analysis was indicated. 
Research Question 4 used data from each tested component of the Expectancy 
Theory, and a Spearman’s rho test was conducted to determine if there were statistically 
significant relationships between factors.  Two significant relationships were discovered.  
The first significant relationship was the relationship with effort and administrator and 
the second significant relationship was the relationship with recognition and 
compensation. 
Description of Chapter V 
 Chapter V provides a Summary of Findings and Discussion for this study.  A 
review of the research methodology and research questions is provided.  An analysis of 
data is presented for each research question, and summaries of the findings are provided.  
Additional recommendations are made for school leaders, and recommendations for 










SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Introduction 
Research has shown that teachers and teacher expertise are the most important 
factors for student learning and achievement (Jensen et al., 2010).  Since the passage of 
No Child Left Behind in 2001, schools have been challenged to demonstrate adequate 
yearly progress (AYP) for all students.  Given the requirements that schools face 
regarding student performance, school districts need highly motivated and qualified 
teachers in the classroom.  When the concepts of the Expectancy Theory are applied to 
current practices for teacher motivation and compensation, the single-salary schedule 
may not offer the best means to motivate and compensate quality teachers.  This study 
addressed how the Expectancy Theory can assist school leaders when increasing teacher 
motivation by reviewing rewards and compensation. 
The purpose of this study was to discern teachers’ perspectives about motivation 
and compensation utilizing Vroom’s Expectancy Theory.  This study applied the major 
components of the Expectancy Theory (expectancy, instrumentality, and valence) and 
directly related them to motivational aspects of compensation and rewards.  The study 
examined how teacher motivation is affected by changes in the expectancy, 
instrumentality, and valence components of the Expectancy Theory. 
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There are three components upon which Vroom’s Expectancy Theory is based 
(Redmond & Hite, 2013).  The first component of the Vroom’s Expectancy Theory is 
expectancy which is described as the belief that higher or increased effort will yield better 
performance.  This concept can be explained by the thinking of if I work harder, I will 
make something better.  Conditions that enhance expectancy include having the correct 
resources available, having the required skill set for the job, and having the necessary 
support to do the job correctly. 
The second component of the Vroom’s Expectancy Theory is instrumentality 
which is described as the thought that, if an individual performs well, a valued outcome 
will come to that individual.  Some things that impact instrumentality are having a clear 
understanding of the relationship between performance and outcomes, having trust and 
respect for people who make decisions about the outcomes, and seeing transparency in 
the process of determining the outcomes. In education, instrumentality is often associated 
with school administrators and performance evaluations. 
The third component of the Vroom’s Expectancy Theory is valence which is the 
“value” and refers to the outcomes’ desirability.  There are individual differences in the 
value associated with specific outcomes.  For example, monetary bonuses may not 
increase the motivation for an employee who prefers recognition.  Valence can be 
thought of as the pressure or importance a person puts on an outcome.  In education, 
valence is often associated with compensation and recognition. 
The researcher designed survey questions that used each factor of the Expectancy 
Theory in an attempt to measure teachers’ perceptions about each factor and to determine 
the impact it has on motivation.  Vroom identified that “positive attitudes toward the job 
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are conceptually equivalent to job satisfaction and negative attitudes toward the job are 
equivalent to job dissatisfaction” (Vroom, 1964, p. 99).  By understanding teachers’ 
perceptions of expectancy, instrumentality, and valence, school leaders can design 
recognition and compensation programs that promote and improve teacher motivation 
and that, in turn, impact student performance. 
Review of Methodology 
 A nine-question survey was developed to address three components of the 
Expectancy Theory.  Section I of the survey consisted of four questions that provided 
demographic data about the respondents.  These data consisted of gender, years of 
teaching experience, level of educational attainment, and current school assignment.  
Section II of the survey consisted of four questions that addressed factors of the 
Expectancy Theory.  Question 6 asked teachers to respond to effort (expectancy).  
Question 7 asked teachers to respond to administrator effectiveness (instrumentality).  
Questions 8 and 9 asked teachers to respond to recognition and compensation (valence).   
 An analysis of the data was conducted using response frequency and inferential 
statistical analysis.  The analysis allowed the researcher to determine the overall 
perception of the respondents regarding each question and to determine if there are 
significant statistical relationships between demographic factors and Expectancy Theory 
factors. 
 Frequency data can be applied to the Expectancy Theory using the formula 
designed by Vroom in 1964 (see Figure 6).  Using the frequency data, the researcher 
applied the results to the formula to determine which factors increase motivation 
according to the teachers’ perceptions. 
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Expectancy     X     Instrumentality     X     Valence   =   Motivation 
(Effort) x (Performance) x (Rewards) = Motivation 
 
Figure 6.  E x I x V = Motivation. 
 
 Results from the inferential statistical analysis were used to determine if certain 
demographic factors were related to responses of the Expectancy Theory factors.  This 
information may allow school leaders to focus certain levels of recognition or rewards on 
specific teacher demographic groups, resulting in a more efficient and effective way to 
motivate teachers. 
 Another set of inferential statistical analysis was utilized to determine if there 
were statistically significant relationships among the Expectancy Theory’s factors.  This 
information may allow school leaders to design systems for reward and recognition that 
effectively address multiple factors of the theory and increase teacher motivation.  The 
result of increased teacher motivation is improved student performance. 
Research Question 1: Effort (Expectancy) 
How do teachers’ perceptions of effort (hard work) impact motivation? 
Frequency Summary 
 Survey Question 6 asked teachers how confident they were that, if they work 
hard, their students would perform better.  A total of 119 teachers responded to this 
question.  Ninety-four teachers (79%) responded in the confident or very confident 
category.  These numbers indicated the respondents may be intrinsically motivated and 
believe their effort impacts student performance. 
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Inferential Statistics Summary 
 The Kruskal-Wallis statistical test was used to determine relationships among the 
demographic factors from Section I of the survey as well as Question 6 from Section II of 
the survey.  There were no statistically significant relationships among the demographic 
factors and effort (expectancy). 
Conclusion 
 Although there were no statistically significant relationships identified among the 
demographic factors and the expectancy factor, the frequency data suggest that the 
majority of teachers believe their hard work will have a positive impact on student 
performance.  Current policy and research neglect to recognize that two powerful and 
sustainable sources of motivation for teachers are improved student learning and support 
gained through collaborative relationships with other teachers (Lewis, Perry, Friedkin, & 
Roth, 2012).  The effort that teachers exude in the classroom must produce improved 
student learning in order to positively affect teachers’ overall motivation. 
Research Question 2: Administrator (Instrumentality) 
How do teachers’ perceptions of instrumentality (the belief that performance will 
lead to reward) impact motivation? 
Frequency Summary 
 Survey Question 7 asked teachers how confident they were their building 
administrator would reward them for hard work.  A total of 120 teachers responded to 
this question.  Fifty-two teachers (43.3%) responded in the Confident or Very Confident 
category.  These numbers indicated that the teachers were not as likely to believe their 
administrators would recognize their hard work in the classroom.  Sixty-eight teachers 
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(56.7%) had less confidence in the building-level administrator’s ability to recognize the 
hard work of the teachers in their buildings. 
Inferential Statistics Analysis 
The Kruskal-Wallis statistical test was used to determine relationships among the 
demographic factors from Section I of the survey as well as Question #7 from Section II 
of the survey.  There were no statistically significant relationships among demographic 
factors and performance (instrumentality). 
Conclusions 
 The factor of instrumentality requires that the employee understands the outcome 
of his/her performance and trusts that the performance evaluation will be conducted 
effectively.  Instrumentality is described as the thought that, if an individual performs 
well, a valued outcome will come to that individual.  Some things that impact 
instrumentality are having a clear understanding about the relationship between 
performance and outcomes, having trust and respect for people who make decisions 
about the outcomes, and seeing transparency in the process of determining the outcomes. 
In education, instrumentality is often associated with school administrators and 
performance evaluations. 
Research Question 3: Recognition and Compensation (Valence) 
How do teachers’ perceptions of valence (the value of the reward) impact 
motivation? 
Frequency Summary 
Research Question 3 was answered by using data from two survey questions.  
Survey Question 8 asked teachers to rate the likelihood they would change their effort if 
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they received social recognition.  Frequency data indicated that, of the 118 teachers who 
responded to the question, most teachers (93, or 78.8%) indicated they were Not Likely 
or Somewhat Likely to increase their effort for social recognition.  The overall response 
of teachers was they were less likely to change the level of effort for social recognition.   
Survey Question 9 asked teachers to rate the likelihood they would change their 
effort if they received additional compensation.  Frequency data indicated that, of the 119 
teachers who responded to the question, 57 teachers (47.9%) indicated they were Likely 
or Very Likely to increase their effort for additional compensation. 
Inferential Statistics Analysis 
The Kruskal-Wallis statistical test was used to determine relationships among the 
demographic factors from Section I of the survey as well as Questions 8 and 9 from 
Section II of the survey.  There were no statistically significant relationships among 
demographic factors and compensation; however, there was a statistically significant 
relationship between years of experience and recognition (valence). 
Conclusions 
 Frequency data suggested that teachers are less motivated by extrinsic factors 
such as social recognition; however, compensation was more motivating than social 
recognition.  In comparison to the other factors studied, the valence factors suggested that 
extrinsic motivators, such as recognition and compensation, were not perceived as 
positively as the intrinsic motivators of hard work and student performance for the 
expectancy component in Survey Question 6. 
 Inferential statistics demonstrated one significant relationship between years of 
experience and recognition.  In a time when teacher turnover costs public education 
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nearly $7 billion annually (Carroll, 2012), this relationship is important for school leaders 
as they attempt to devise programs that recruit, motivate, and retain high-quality teachers.  
The relationship between motivation, and job satisfaction, and performance is clearly 
established: positively motivated employees are more creative, motivated, and satisfied. 
Research Question 4: Expectancy, Instrumentality, and Valence 
What relationships among the three factors (expectancy, instrumentality, and 
valence) impact motivation? 
Inferential Statistical Analysis 
 Additional data analysis was conducted using Spearman’s rho test for correlation; 
each component was analyzed for significance.  Correlation was significant at the .05 
level (2-tailed).  
 An analysis of the data determined two significant relationships among the four 
factors.  The relationship with effort with administrator was statistically significant 
(Spearman’s rho (n = 119) = .298, p = .001).  The relationship with recognition with 
compensation was statistically significant (Spearman’s rho (n= 117) = .630, p = .001). 
 The relationship between effort and administrator suggests that teachers who are 
highly motivated have a greater level of confidence in the building administrator’s ability 
to recognize the hard work and the effort demonstrated in the classroom.  This 
relationship supports the concept that teachers who feel supported are more likely to be 
satisfied with their jobs.  When applied to the Expectancy Theory, a high level of 
expectancy and a high level of instrumentality yield a high level of motivation. 
 The relationship between recognition and compensation suggests that teachers 
want to receive some level of reward for the work they do.  Whether through social 
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recognition or compensation, teachers need to perceive that the value of the reward is 
significant enough to continue working hard.  School leaders need to create incentives 
that are valued by teachers, thus increasing motivation. 
Conclusion 
Education-reform discussions focus on two themes, teacher performance and 
student learning.  Performance-based pay may elicit both incentive effects: raising 
motivation of and effort from teachers who want to increase their pay (Woessmann, 
2010).  This type of compensation reward may attract and retain teachers.   
 Although the survey data did not overwhelmingly support compensation as the 
primary means to motivate teachers, there are data to support the important measures that 
school leaders should take to assist with teacher motivation (Goldhaber, 2008).  The 
Expectancy Theory provides school leaders with a measurable way to gauge teacher 
motivation using the components of expectancy, instrumentality, and valence.  
Recommendations for School Leaders 
 When applying the Expectancy Theory to the survey results, the current data 
suggested areas of concern before the implementation of a performance-based 
compensation plan.  While compensation is an extrinsic motivator, the survey conducted 
for this study indicated that teachers were more likely to be motivated intrinsically; 
believing that working hard would increase student performance. 
 School leaders must recognize that intrinsic motivation is an important factor for 
teacher motivation and job satisfaction.  For Question 6 of Section II, teachers were asked 
about their level of confidence that their hard work would help students perform well.  Of 
the 119 teachers who responded to the question, 94 teachers (74.2%) were Confident or 
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Very Confident that their hard work would increase student performance.  This intrinsic 
motivation was not restricted to new or inexperienced teachers.  Frequency data from the 
survey suggested that, of the 128 teachers who responded to the question about years of 
experience, 116 teachers (90.6%) had 3 or more years of experience.  Seventy-nine 
teachers (61.7%) had 11 or more years of experience.  Building administrators should 
recognize this type of motivation and should look for and share positive student data with 
all teachers to increase the expectancy component of the theory.   
There are several strategies school leaders can implement that may increase 
teacher effort, improve student learning, and increase motivation.  Hiebert and Morris 
(2012) indicated that the focus needs to shift from improving “teachers” to improving 
“teaching.”  This shift from improving teachers to improving teaching requires school 
leaders to give teachers time to collaborate and to create two significant instructional 
products: “specially annotated lesson plans and common assessments” (Hiebert & 
Morris, 2012, p. 94).  These instructional activities provide teachers with the resources 
they need to effectively instruct and measure the learner outcomes for each lesson, thus 
increasing effort and motivation. 
As Lewis et al. (2012) identified, a teacher’s relationship with his/her colleagues 
can impact motivation.  “Although some teachers manage to invent techniques on their 
own, many more teachers could probably learn them if they had systematic opportunities 
to learn from colleagues” (Lewis et al., 2012, p. 372).  In addition to building teachers’ 
knowledge, collaboration can build shared professional norms and motivation (Lewis et 
al., 2012).   
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This researcher suggests that the building leader look at collaborative models such 
as Professional Learning Communities to promote teacher collaboration.  Hord (2004) 
described five interrelated dimensions that are characteristic of schools that have 
successfully adopted a Professional Learning Community model.  Hord proposed that a 
school that organized itself as a Professional Learning Community exhibits supportive 
and shared leadership, shared values and vision, collective learning and an application of 
learning, supportive conditions, and shared practice.  The conversations that teachers 
have regarding student performance may increase teacher effort and may increase the 
teachers’ intrinsic motivation. 
Local, state, and federal achievement standards have changed the landscape of 
educational accountability.  School leaders are being held accountable for how well 
teachers teach and students learn.  In order to meet these challenges, school leaders must 
design programs that support teachers, encourage student performance, and increase 
motivation.   
 Effective school leaders recognize the teacher leaders in their building.  School 
leaders who promote and encourage teacher leaders have found that teacher leaders can 
help others to embrace school goals, understand the changes needed to strengthen 
teaching and learning, and create collaboration that works toward school improvement 
(Leithwood & Riehl, 2003).  This recognition requires school leaders to define the roles 
for teacher leaders, to identify specific outcomes, and to provide feedback and evaluation 
standards that promote motivation.  All components of the Expectancy Theory are 
addressed in this type of programming. 
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 Another area of concern is the frequency data from Question #7 from Section II of 
the survey where respondents were asked about their confidence the building 
administrator would recognize and reward them for hard work in the classroom.  Of the 
120 teachers who responded to the question, 58 teachers (56.7%) had a negative 
perception of the building administrator’s ability to recognize and reward their hard 
work.  The Expectancy Theory suggests that this lack of connection between the 
teachers’ individual performance (expectancy) and the performance reward 
(instrumentality) limits the motivational impact of the reward.   
 Effective school leaders build relationships and positive school culture that 
promote collaboration and high expectations for student performance.  Promoting 
collaboration requires building leaders to shift from the role of manager to the role of 
instructional leader.   
The most effective principals focus on building a sense of school community. . . .  
This includes respect for every member of the school community; an upbeat 
welcoming, solution-oriented, no-blame, professional environment; and efforts to 
involve staff and students in a variety of activities, many of them school-wide. 
(Wallace Foundation, 2013, p. 9) 
 
In education, the building administrator is responsible for conducting performance 
evaluations for teachers in their building.  Given the results for Survey Question 7, it is 
essential that building administrators clearly define performance expectations for teachers 
and adequately evaluate the teachers’ performance.  It is also important for building 
administrators to recognize their teachers’ hard work.  Recognition can be accomplished 
through feedback provided during informal classroom walk-throughs as well as the 
formal evaluation process.  The MET Project (2013) identifies nine principles that school 
leaders could use to measure effective teaching.  This framework outlines methods that 
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will enhance the evaluation process and promote teacher effectiveness in the classroom 
(see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Framework for Teacher Evaluation (MET Project, 2013). 
“Leaders do not merely impose goals on followers, but work with others to create 
a shared sense of purpose and direction” (Leithwood & Riehl, 2003, p. 4).  In a study 
conducted in 2010, Day et al. reported that successful school leaders define their values 
and visions to raise expectations, set direction, and build trust.  School leaders enhanced 
the quality of teaching and learning by building collaboration and strong relationships 
with teachers (Day et al., 2010).  School leaders were encouraged to provide a safe 
environment to try new models and alternative approaches that might be more effective.  
When provided with this type of environment, teachers saw themselves as professionals 
and improved their sense of self-efficacy.  This improved sense of self-efficacy, in turn, 
had a positive impact on the way they interacted with students and other teachers (Day et 
al., 2010). 
The survey data indicated a statistically significant relationship for Survey 
Questions 6 and 7 (effort and administrator).  This relationship supported the need for 
school leaders to increase the level of confidence teachers feel about their ability to 
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recognize and reward teacher effort.  School leaders may not be able to directly impact 
teacher effort, but increasing the instrumentality component of the Expectancy Theory 
may increase the teachers’ motivation.  Increasing the instrumentality component 
happens by creating a clear vision for the school and cultivating a culture of collaboration 
and academic performance. 
The last concern indicated by the study was the level of likelihood that teachers 
would change their effort level for social recognition or compensation.  Of the 118 
teachers who responded to Survey Question 8 regarding social recognition, 93 teachers 
(78.8%) stated they were Not Likely or Somewhat Likely to change their effort for this 
reward.  Of the 119 teachers who responded to Survey Question 9, 62 teachers (52.1%) 
indicated that they were Not Likely or Somewhat Likely to change their effort for this 
reward.  The valence component of the Expectancy Theory suggested that the rewards 
must be significant enough to be perceived as valuable to the employee. 
Although this study did not specifically address the amount of compensation 
awarded for increased effort, compensation, as well as recognition data, indicated 
respondents less likely to change the level of effort for compensation and social 
recognition.  Additional research in this area might provide school leaders with a more 
specific indicator of value when rewarding teachers. 
While researchers have found that improvements in teacher recruitment and 
retention are correlated to financial factors, teacher retention is influenced by professional 
development opportunities, work conditions, and building-leader support (Jensen et al., 
2010).  School leaders are encouraged to work with staff to design programs that 
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recognize and support teachers, as well as to award additional compensation when 
possible.  
Recommendations for Further Study 
 This study was limited to three school buildings within the Fargo Public School 
District.  Additional research studies that include other districts throughout the state 
would enhance the generalizations made regarding teacher perceptions about motivation 
and compensation.  In particular, additional research including demographic information 
regarding school-district size and the number of building administrators would enhance 
the suggested outcomes of the study. 
 Further research regarding teacher motivation, both intrinsic and extrinsic, would 
assist building administrators in designing the most effective strategies to recruit and 
retain highly-qualified teacher for their buildings.  Determining the importance of these 
factors was limited due to the research questions’ focus. 
 Further research regarding overall satisfaction with teacher pay would be 
important in determining the positive or negative response for performance-based pay 
within school districts.  Merit-pay plans rose quickly in the 1980s and faded just as 
rapidly.  The failings of these past merit plans were well documented (Murnane & Cohen, 
1986; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  Merit-pay plans were often 
based on the principal’s evaluations of teacher performance.  This subjective form of 
evaluation encouraged competition among teachers.  This discourse among teachers led 
to the failure of many plans because teachers and teacher unions were not supportive 
(Ryan, 2008).  School districts continued to attempt alternative compensation programs 
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with varying results.  Additional research study about alternative compensation plans and 
teacher-evaluation models may provide insight regarding the failure of these plans. 
This study focused on compensation as a factor to increase motivation using the 
Expectancy Theory as the model.  Job satisfaction and compensation research might 


















































Expectancy Theory:  Teacher’s Perspective of Motivation and Compensation 
 
This survey was developed to gain teachers’ perspectives of motivation and 
compensation.  Your participation in this survey is voluntary.  Your responses do not 
identify personal information or current place of employment.  Please respond to the 
following questions. 
 
If you agree to complete this survey please,  check yes.  If you wish to leave the survey, 
please check no. 
YES     NO 
 




2. Total number of years you have been employed as a professional educator? 
a. Fewer than 3 years 
b. 3 to 10 years 
c. 11 to 20 years 
d. 21 or more years 
 






4. Current school assignment? 
a. Elementary School 
b. Middle School 
c. High School 
 
5. How confident are you that if you work hard, your students will perform well?  
 




6.  How confident are you that your building administrator will reward you for 
your hard work? 
 
Not Confident   Somewhat Confident Confident Very Confident 
 
7. Your school has just announced a performance-based pay plan.  As part of this 
plan, a recognition ceremony will be conducted for qualifying teachers.  How 
likely would you be to increase your effort next year for this social recognition? 
 
Not Likely          Somewhat Likely  Likely    Very Likely 
 
8. Your school has just announced a performance-based pay plan.  As part of this 
plan, additional compensation will be awarded to qualifying teachers.  How likely 
would you be to increase your effort next year for this additional compensation? 
 



























Email to Participants 
 
University of North Dakota 
College of Education and Human Development 
Department of Educational Leadership 
Phone:  701.777.4255 
Education Building, Room 374, 231 Centennial Drive Stop 7189, Grand Forks, ND  
58202-7189 
 





My name is Jennifer Soupir-Fremstad.  I am a graduate student in the Educational 
Leadership program at the University of North Dakota and I am conducting research to 
determine teachers’ perceptions of alternative compensation plans. 
 
I am inviting you to take part in this study.  Your participation is voluntary and you will 
not be required to identify yourself or the school in which you are employed.  You can 
choose to withdraw your participation at any time during the survey.  By taking part in 
the study, you will provide information that will be beneficial when discussing teacher 
compensation in the state of North Dakota. 
 
The survey will take approximately 5-10 minutes to complete.  Your responses will 
remain confidential.  At the end of the survey, you will have the opportunity to write 
additional comments regarding alternative compensation; I ask that you provide as much 
information as possible in those comments. 
 
Please click this link to begin the survey:  
https://und.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9LVfbrigJeaCbwV 
 
If you have any questions about this research project, you may contact me by email at 
jfremstad33@gmail.com or by calling 701.730.8265.  You may contact my advisor, Dr. 




Thank you for taking the time to participate in this research.  If you wish to receive a 















Follow-up Email to Participants 
 
I would like to thank those who have taken the time to complete the short survey 
“Expectancy Theory:  Teachers’ Perspectives of Motivation and Compensation”.   
 
There is still time to participate in this study.  The survey will remain active until 
Thursday, May 30
th
.  If you have not completed the survey, please consider doing 
so.  The average time to complete the survey is under 5 minutes.  
 
Click on the following link to complete the 
survey:  https://und.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9LVfbrigJeaCbwV 
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